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Abstract
Privacy concerns in outsourced cloud databases have become more and more important recently
and many efficient and scalable query processing methods over encrypted data have been proposed.
However, there is very limited work on how to securely process top-k ranking queries over encrypted
databases in the cloud. In this paper, we focus exactly on this problem: secure and efficient processing
of top-k queries over outsourced databases. In particular, we propose the first efficient and provable
secure top-k query processing construction that achieves adaptively CQA security. We develop an
encrypted data structure called EHL and describe several secure sub-protocols under our security
model to answer top-k queries. Furthermore, we optimize our query algorithms for both space and
time efficiency. Finally, in the experiments, we empirically analyze our protocol using real world
datasets and demonstrate that our construction is efficient and practical.
1 Introduction
As remote storage and cloud computing services emerge, such as Amazon’s EC2, Google AppEngine,
and Microsoft’s Azure, many enterprises, organizations, and end users may outsource their data to
those cloud service providers for reliable maintenance, lower cost, and better performance. In fact,
a number of database systems on the cloud have been developed recently that offer high availability
and flexibility at relatively low costs. However, despite these benefits, there are still a number of
reasons that make many users to refrain from using these services, especially users with sensitive and
valuable data. Undoubtedly, the main issue for this is related to security and privacy concerns [3].
Indeed, data owner and clients may not fully trust a public cloud since some of hackers, or the cloud’s
administrators with root privilege can fully access all data for any purpose. Sometimes the cloud
provider may sell its business to an untrusted company, which will have full access to the data. One
approach to address these issues is to encrypt the data before outsourcing them to the cloud. For
example, electronic health records (EHRs) should be encrypted before outsourcing in compliance with
regulations like HIPAA1. Encrypted data can bring an enhanced security into the Database-As-Service
environment [25]. However, it also introduces significant difficulties in querying and computing over
these data.
Although top-k queries are important query types in many database applications [28], to the best of
our knowledge, none of the existing works handle the top-k queries securely and efficiently. Vaiyda et.
al. [46] studied privacy-preserving top-k queries in which the data are vertically partitioned instead of
encrypting the data. Wong et. al. [48] proposed an encryption scheme for knn queries and mentioned a
method of transforming their scheme to solve top-k queries, however, as shown in [50], their encryption
scheme is not secure and is vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks. Vaiyda et. al. [46] also studied
∗Amazon AWS xmeng@cs.bu.edu
†Facebook zhu@cs.bu.edu
‡Boston University gkollios@cs.bu.edu
1HIPAA is the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
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privacy-preserving top-k queries in which the data are vertically partitioned instead of encrypting the
data.
We assume that the data owner and the clients are trusted, but not the cloud server. Therefore,
the data owner encrypts each database relation R using some probabilistic encryption scheme before
outsourcing it to the cloud. An authorized user specifies a query q and generates a token to query the
server. Our objective is to allow the cloud to securely compute the top-k results based on a user-defined
ranking function over R, and, more importantly, the cloud should not learn anything about R or q.
Consider a real world example for a health medical database below:
Example 1.1. An authorized doctor, Alice, wants to get the top-k results based on some ranking
criteria from the encrypted electronic health record database patients (see Table 1). The encrypted
patients database may contain several attributes; here we only list a few in Table 1: patient name,
age, id number, trestbps 2, chol3, thalach4.
patient name age id trestbps chol thalach
E(Bob) E(38) E(121) E(110) E(196) E(166)
E(Celvin) E(43) E(222) E(120) E(201) E(160)
E(David) E(60) E(285) E(100) E(248) E(142)
E(Emma) E(36) E(956) E(120) E(267) E(112)
E(Flora) E(43) E(756) E(100) E(223) E(127)
Table 1: Encrypted patients Heart-Disease Data
One example of a top-k query (in the form of a SQL query) can be: SELECT * FROM patients
ORDERED BY chol+thalach STOP AFTER k. That is, the doctor wants to get the top-2 results based
the score chol + thalach from all the patient records. However, since this table contains very sensitive
information about the patients, the data owner first encrypts the table and then delegates it to the cloud.
So, Alice requests a key from the data owner and generates a query token based on the query. Then
the cloud searches and computes on the encrypted table to find out the top-k results. In this case, the
top-2 results are the records of patients David and Emma.
Our protocol extends the No-Random-Access (NRA) [22] algorithm for computing top-k queries
over a probabilistically encrypted relational database. Moreover, our query processing model assumes
that two non-colluding semi-honest clouds, which is the model that has been showed working well
(see [21, 12, 36, 7, 11]). We encrypt the database in such a way that the server can obliviously execute
NRA over the encrypted database without learning the underlying data. This is accomplished with
the help of a secondary independent cloud server (or Crypto Cloud). However, the encrypted database
resides only in the primary cloud. We adopt two efficient state-of-art secure protocols, EncSort [7] and
EncCompare [11], which are the two building block we need in our top-k secure construction. We choose
these two building blocks mainly because of their efficiency.
During the query processing, we propose several novel sub-routines that can securely compute the
best/worst score and de-duplicate replicated data items over the encrypted database. Notice that our
proposed sub-protocols can also be used as stand-alone building blocks for other applications as well.
We also would like to point out that during the querying phase the computation performed by the client
is very small. The client only needs to compute a simple token for the server and all of the relatively
heavier computations are performed by the cloud side. Moreover, we also explore the problem of top-k
join queries over multiple encrypted relations.
2trestbps: resting blood pressure (in mm Hg)
3chol: serum cholestoral in mg/dl
4maximum heart rate achieved
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We also design a secure top-k join operator, denote as ./sec, to securely join the tables based on
equi-join condition. The cloud homomorphically computes the top-k join on the top of joined results
and reports the encrypted top-k results. Below we summarize our main contributions:
• We propose a new practical protocol designed to answer top-k queries over encrypted relational
databases.
• We propose an encrypted data structures called EHL which allows the servers to homomorphically
evaluate the equality relations between two objects.
• We propose several independent sub-protocols such that the clouds can securely compute the
best/worst scores and de-duplicate replicated encrypted objects with the use of another non-
colluding server.
• We also extend our techniques to answer top-k join queries over multiple encrypted relations.
• The scheme is experimentally evaluated using real-world datasets and result shows that our scheme
is efficient and practical.
2 Related Works and Background
The problem of processing queries over the outsourced encrypted databases is not new. The work [25]
proposed executing SQL queries over encrypted data in the database-service-provider model using
bucketization. Since then, a number of works have appeared on executing various queries over encrypted
data.
A significant amount of works have been done for privacy preserving keyword search queries or
boolean queries, such as [44, 17, 13]. Recent work [42] proposed a general framework for boolean queries
of disjunctive normal form queries on encrypted data. In addition, many works have been proposed for
range queries [43, 27, 33]. Other relevant works include privacy-preserving data mining [2, 30, 47, 35, 37].
Recent works in the cryptography community have shown that it is possible to perform arbi-
trary computations over encrypted data, using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [23], or Oblivious
RAM [24]. However, the performance overheads of such constructions are very high in practice, thus
they’re not suitable for practical database queries. Some recent advancements in ORAM schemes [41]
show promise and can be potentially used in certain environments. As mentioned, [46] is the only work
that studied privacy preserving execution of top-k queries. However, their approach is mainly based
on the k-anonymity privacy policies, therefore, it cannot extended to encrypted databases. Recently,
differential privacy [20] has emerged as a powerful model to protect against unknown adversaries with
guaranteed probabilistic accuracy. However, here we consider encrypted data in the outsourced model;
moreover, we do not want our query answer to be perturbed by noise, but we want our query result to
be exact. Kuzu et. al. [32] proposed a scheme that leverages DP and leaks obfuscated access statistics
to enable efficient searching. Another approach has been extensively studied is order-preserving en-
cryption (OPE) [2, 4, 9, 40, 35], which preserves the order of the message. We note that, by definition,
OPE directly reveals the order of the objects’ ranks, thus does not satisfy our data privacy guaran-
tee. Furthermore, [26] proposed a prototype for access control using deterministic proxy encryption,
and other secure database systems have been proposed by using embedded secure hardware, such as
TrustedDB [6] and Cipherbase [5].
Secure kNN queries. One of the most relevant problems is answering kNN (k Nearest Neighbor)
queries. Note that top-k queries should not be confused with similarity search, such as kNN queries.
For kNN queries, one is interested in retrieving the k most similar objects from the database to a query
object, where the similarity between two objects is measured over some metric space, for instance using
the L2 metric. Many works have been proposed to specifically handle kNN queries on encrypted data,
such as [48, 50, 15].
A recent work [21] proposed secure kNN query under the same architecture setting as ours. We
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would like to point out that their solution does not directly solve the problem of top-k queries. In
particular, [21] designed a protocol for ranking distances between the query point and the records using
the L2 metric, while we consider the top-k selection query based on a class of scoring functions using
linear combinations of attribute values. Nevertheless, if we follow the similar setup from [21], we can
define the scoring function to be the sum of the squares, i.e.
∑
x2i (o), where xi(o) is the i-th attribute
value for object o and is a positive value. Then one can adapt the secure kNN scheme by querying a
large enough query point (say, the upper bound of the attribute value) to get the k-nearest-neighbors
and therefore it can return top-k results. We show in Section 11, that even under this particular setting,
our protocol is much more efficient than [21]. The computational complexity, for each query, for [21]
is at least O(nm), where n is the number of records and m the number of attributes. Furthermore,
the communication overhead between the two clouds is also O(nm). Thus, this protocol is not very
efficient for even small sized databases.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Problem Definition
Consider a data owner that has a database relation R of n objects, denoted by o1, . . . , on, and each
object oi has M attributes. For simplicity, we assume that all M attributes take numerical values.
Thus, the relation R is an n ×M matrix. The data owner would like to outsource R to a third-party
cloud S1 that is completely untrusted. Therefore, data owner encrypts R and sends the encrypted
relation ER to the cloud. After that, any authorized client should be able to get the results of the top-k
query over this encrypted relation directly from S1, by specifying k and a score function over the M
(encrypted) attributes. We consider the monotone scoring (ranking) functions that are weighted linear
combinations over all attributes, that is FW (o) =
∑
wi × xi(o), where each wi ≥ 0 is a user-specified
weight for the i-th attribute and xi(o) is the local score (value) of the i-th attribute for object o. Note
that we consider the monotone linear function mainly because it is the most important and widely used
score function on top-k queries [28]. The results of a top-k query are the objects with the highest k
scores of FW values. For example, consider an authorized client, Alice, who wants to run a top-k query
over the encrypted relation ER. Consider the following query: q = SELECT * FROM ER ORDER BY FW (·)
STOP AFTER k; That is, Alice wants to get the top-k results based on her scoring function FW , for a
specified set of weights. Alice first has to request the keys from the data owner, then generates a query
token tk. Alice sends the tk to the cloud server. The cloud server storing the encrypted database ER
processes the top-k query and sends the encrypted results back to Alice. In the real world scenarios,
the authorized clients can locally store the keys for generating the token.
3.2 The Architecture
We consider the secure computation on the cloud under the semi-honest (or honest-but-curious) adver-
sarial model. Furthermore, our model assumes the existence of two different non-colluding semi-honest
cloud providers, S1 and S2, where S1 stores the encrypted database ER and S2 holds the secret keys
and provides the crypto services. We refer to the server S2 as the Crypto Cloud and assume S2 resides
in the cloud environment and is isolated from S1. The two parties S1 and S2 do not trust each other,
and therefore, they have to execute secure computations on encrypted data. The two parties S1 and
S2 belong to two different cloud providers and do not trust each other; therefore, they have to execute
secure computations on encrypted data. In fact, crypto clouds have been built and used in some in-
dustrial applications today (e.g., the pCloud Crypto5 or boxcryptor6). This model is not new and has
already been widely used in related work, such as [21, 12, 36, 7, 11]. As pointed out by these works, we
5
https://www.pcloud.com/encrypted-cloud-storage.html
6
https://www.boxcryptor.com/en/provider
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emphasize that these cloud services are typically provided by some large companies, such as Amazon,
Microsoft Azure, and Google, who have also commercial interests not to collude. The Crypto Cloud S2
is equipped with a cryptographic processor, which stores the decryption key. The intuition behind such
an assumption is as follows. Most of the cloud service providers in the market are well-established IT
companies, such as Amazon AWS, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud. Therefore, a collusion between
them is highly unlikely as it will damage their reputation which effects their revenues. When the server
S1 receives the query token, S1 initiates the secure computation protocol with the Crypto Cloud S2.
Figure 1 shows an overview of the architecture.
Authorized 
Clients
key key
…
Enc(database)
query token
Encrypted top-k answer
Crypto Cloud S2
Cloud S1
Encrypted	
Data
Data Owner
Figure 1: An overview of our model
3.3 Cryptographic Tools
In Table 2 we summarize the notation. In the following, we present the cryptographic primitives used
in our construction.
Paillier Cryptosystem The Paillier cryptosystem [38] is a semantically secure public key encryption
scheme. The message space M for the encryption is ZN , where N is a product of two large prime
numbers p and q. For a message m ∈ ZN , we denote Encpk(m) ∈ ZN2 to be the encryption of m with
the public key pk. When the key is clear in the text, we simply use Enc(m) to denote the encryption
of m and Decsk(c) to denote the decryption of a ciphertext c. The details of encryption and decryption
algorithm can be found in [38]. It has the following homomorphic properties:
• Addition: ∀x, y ∈ ZN , Enc(x) · Enc(y) = Enc(x+ y)
• Scalar Multiplication: ∀x, a ∈ ZN , Enc(x)a = Enc(a · x)
Generalized Paillier Our construction also relies on Damg˚ard-Jurik(DJ) cryptosystem introduced
by Damg˚ard and Jurik [18], which is a generalization of Paillier encryption. The message space M
expands to ZNs for s ≥ 1, and the ciphertext space is under the group ZNs+1 . As mentioned in [1], this
generalization allows one to doubly encrypt messages and use the additive homomorphism of the inner
encryption layer under the same secret key. In particular, let E2(x) denote an encryption of the DJ
scheme for a message x ∈ ZN2 (when s = 2) and Enc(x) be a normal Paillier encryption. This extension
allows a ciphertext of the first layer to be treated as a plaintext in the second layer. Moreover, this
nested encryption preserves the structure over inner ciphertexts and allows one to manipulate it as
follows:
E2(Enc(m1))Enc(m2) = E2(Enc(m1) · Enc(m2)) = E2(Enc(m1 +m2))
We note that this is the only homomorphic property that our construction relies on.
Throughout this paper, we use ∼ to denote that the underlying plaintext under encryption E are
the same, i.e., Enc(x) ∼ Enc(y)⇒ x = y. We summarize the notation throughout this paper in Table 2.
Note that in our application, we need one layered encryption; that is, given E2(Enc(x)), we want a
5
Notation Definition
n Size of the relation R, i.e. |R| = n
M Total number of attributes in R
m Total number of attributes for the query q
Enc(m) Paillier encryption of m
Dec(c) Paillier decryption of c
E2(m) Damg˚ard-Jurik (DJ) encryption of m
Enc(x) ∼ Enc(y) Denotes x = y, i.e. Dec(Enc(x)) = Dec(Enc(y))
EHL(o) Encrypted Hash List of the object o
EHL+(o) Efficient Encrypted Hash List of the object o
	,  EHL and EHL+ operations, see Section 5.
Idi The data item in the ith sorted list Li at depth d
E(Idi ) Encrypted data item I
d
i
FW (o) Cost function in the query token
Bd(o) The best score (upper bound) of o at depth d
W d(o) The worst score (lower bound) of o at depth d
Table 2: Notation Summarization
normal Paillier encryption Enc(x). As introduced in [7], this could simply be done with the help of S2.
However, we need a protocol RecoverEnc to securely remove one layer of encryption.
3.4 No-Random-Access (NRA) Algorithm
Algorithm 1: NRA Algorithm [22]
1 def NRA
(
L1, ..., LM
)
:
2 Do sorted access in parallel to each of the M sorted lists Li. At each depth d: repeat
3 Maintain the bottom values xd1, x
d
2, ..., x
d
M encountered in the lists;
4 For every object oi compute a lower bound W
d(oi) and upper bound B
d(oi);
5 Let T dk , the current top k list, contain the k objects with the largest W
d(·) values seen so
far (and their grades), and let Mdk be the kth largest lower bound value, W
d(·) in T dk ;
6 Halt and return T dk when at least k distinct objects have been seen (so that in particular
T dk contains k objects) and when B
d(ok) ≤Mdk for all ok /∈ T dk , i.e. the upper bound for
every object who’s not in T dk is no greater than M
d
k . Otherwise, go to next depth;
7 until;
The NRA algorithm [22] finds the top-k answers by exploiting only sorted accesses to the relation R.
The input to the NRA algorithm is a set of sorted lists S, each ranks the “same” set of objects based
on different attributes. The output is a ranked list of these objects ordered on the aggregate input
scores. We opted to use this algorithm because it provides a scheme that leaks minimal information to
the cloud server (since during query processing there is no need to access intermediate objects). We
assume that each column (attribute) is sorted independently to create a set of sorted lists S. The set of
sorted lists is equivalent to the original relation, but the objects in each list L are sorted in ascending
order according to their local score (attribute value). After sorting, R contains M sorted lists, denoted
as S = {L1, L2, . . . , LM}. Each sorted list consists of n data items, denoted as Li = {I1i , I2i , . . . , Ini }.
Each data item is a object/value pair Idi = (o
d
i , x
d
i ), where o
d
i and x
d
i are the object id and local score at
the depth d (when d objects have been accessed under sorted access in each list) in the ith sorted list
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respectively. Since it produces the top-k answers using bounds computed over their exact scores, NRA
may not report the exact object scores. The score lower bound of some object o, W (o), is obtained by
applying the ranking function on o’s known scores and the minimum possible values of o’s unknown
scores. The score upper bound of o, B(o), is obtained by applying the ranking function on o’s known
scores and the maximum possible values of o’s unknown scores, which are the same as the last seen
scores in the corresponding ranked lists. The algorithm reports a top-k object even if its score is not
precisely known. Specifically, if the score lower bound of an object o is not below the score upper
bounds of all other objects (including unseen objects), then o can be safely reported as the next top-k
object. We give the details of the NRA in Algorithm 1.
4 Scheme Overview
In this section, we give an overview of our scheme. The two non-colluding semi-honest cloud servers
are denoted by S1 and S2.
Definition 4.1. Let SecTopK = (Enc,Token, SecQuery) be the secure top-k query scheme containing
three algorithms Enc, Token and SecQuery.
• Enc(λ,R): is the probabilistic encryption algorithm that takes relation R and security parameter
λ as its inputs and outputs the encrypted relation ER and secret key K.
• Token(K, q): takes a query q and secret key K. It outputs a token tk for the query q.
• SecQuery(tk,ER) is the query processing algorithm that takes the token tk and ER and securely
computes top-k results based on the tk.
As mentioned earlier, our encryption scheme takes advantage of the NRA top-k algorithm. The idea
of Enc is to encrypt and permute the set of sorted lists for R, so that the server can execute a variation
of the NRA algorithm using only sequential accesses to the encrypted data. To do this encryption, we
design a new encrypted data structure for the objects, called EHL. The Token computes a token that
serves as a trapdoor so that the cloud knows which list to access. In SecQuery, S1 scans the encrypted
data depth by depth for each targeted list, maintaining a list of encrypted top-k object ids per depth
until there are k encrypted object ids that satisfy the NRA halting condition. During this process,
S1 and S2 learn nothing about the underlying scores and objects. At the end of the protocol, the
object ids can be reported to the client. As we discuss next, there are two options after that. Either
the encrypted records are retrieved and returned to the client, or the client retrieves the records using
oblivious RAM [24] that does not even reveal the location of the actual encrypted records. In the first
case, the server can get some additional information by observing the access patterns, i.e., the encrypted
results of different queries. However, there are schemes that address this access leakage [29, 32] and is
beyond the scope of this paper. The second approach may be more expensive but is completely secure.
In the following sections, we first discuss the new encrypted data structures EHL and EHL+. Then,
we present the three algorithms Enc, Token and SecQuery in more details.
5 Encrypted Hash List (EHL)
In this paper, we propose a new data structure called encrypted hash list (EHL) to encrypt each
object. The main purpose of this structure is to allow the cloud to homomorphically compute equality
between the objects, whereas it is computationally hard for the server to figure out what the objects
are. Intuitively, the idea is that given an object o we use s Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) to hash
the object into a binary list of length H and then encrypt all the bits in the list to generate EHL. In
partilar, we use the secure key-hash functions HMAC as the PRFs. Let EHL(o) be the encrypted list of
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an object o and let EHL(o)[i] denote the ith encryption in the list. In particular, we initialize an empty
list EHL of length H and fill all the entries with 0. First, we generate s secure keys κ1, ..., κs. The
object o is hashed to a list as follows: 1) Set EHL[HMAC(κi, o) mod H] = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ s. 2) Encrypt
each bit using Paillier encryption: for 0 ≤ j ≤ H − 1, Enc(EHL(o)[j]). Fig. 2 shows how we obtain
EHL(o) for the object o.
Secret Keys: k1, …, kS 
…
…
EHL(o):
HMAC (k1,o ) HMAC (k2,o ) HMAC (k S , o)
HMAC (k 1,o)%H HMAC (k 2,o)%H HMAC (k S , o)%H
E(0) E(1) E(0) E(0) E(1) … ... E(1)
0 1 2 H-1…      ...
o
Figure 2: Encrypted Hash List for the object o.
Lemma 5.1. Given two objects o1 and o2, their EHL(o1) and EHL(o2) are computationally indistin-
guishable.
It is obvious to see that Lemma 5.1 holds since the bits in the EHL are encrypted by the semantically
secure Paillier encryption scheme. Given EHL(x) and EHL(y), we define the randomized operation 	
between EHL(x) and EHL(y) as follows:
EHL(x)	 EHL(y) def=
H−1∏
i=0
(
EHL(x)[i] · EHL(y)[i]−1)ri (1)
where each ri is some random value in ZN .
Lemma 5.2. Let Enc(b) = EHL(x) 	 EHL(y). Then the plaintext b = 0 if x = y (two objects are the
same), otherwise b is uniformly distributed in the group ZN with high probability.
Proof: Let Enc(xi) = EHL(x)[i] and Enc(yi) = EHL(y)[i]. If x = y, i.e. they are the same objects,
then for all i ∈ [0, H − 1], xi = yi. Therefore,
H−1∏
i=0
(EHL(x)[i] · EHL(y)[i]−1)ri = E(H−1∑
i=0
(ri(xi − yi))
)
= Enc(0)
In the case of x 6= y, it must be true, with high probability, that there exists some i ∈ [0, H − 1] such
that Enc(xi)  Enc(yi), i.e. the underlying bit at location i in EHL(x) is different from the bit in
EHL(y). Suppose EHL(x)[i] = Enc(1) and EHL(y)[i] = Enc(0). Therefore, the following holds:(
EHL(x)[i] · EHL(y)[i]−1)ri = Enc(ri(1− 0)) = Enc(ri)
Hence, based on the definition 	, it follows that b becomes random value uniformly distributed in the
group ZN . 
It is worth noting that one can also use BGN cryptosystem for the similar operations above, as the
BGN scheme can homomorphically evaluate quadratic functions.
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False Positive Rate. Note that the construction is indeed a probabilistically encrypted Bloom Filter
except that we use one list for each object and encrypt each bit in the list. The construction of EHL
may report some false positive results for its 	 operation, i.e. Enc(0) ← EHL(x)	EHL(y) when x 6= y.
This is due to the fact that x and y may be hashed to exactly the same locations using s many HMACs.
Therefore, it is easy to see that the false positive rate (FPR) is the same as the FPR of the Bloom
Filter, where we can choose the number of hash functions HMAC s to be Hn ln 2 to minimize the false
positive rate to be (1 − (1 − 1H
sn
))s ≈ (1 − e−sn/H)s ≈ 0.62H/n. To reduce the false positive rate, we
can increase the length of the list H. However, this will increase the cost of the structure both in terms
of space overhead and number of operations for the randomization operation which is O(H). In the
next subsection, we introduce a more compact and space-efficient encrypted data structure EHL+.
EHL+. We now present a computation- and space-efficient encrypted hash list EHL+. The idea of
the efficient EHL+ is to first ‘securely hash’ the object o to a larger space s times and only encrypt
those hash values. Therefore, for the operation 	, we only homomorphically subtract those hashed
values. The complexity now reduces to O(s) as opposed to O(H), where s is the number of the secure
hash functions used. We show that one can get negligible false positive rate even using a very small
s. To create an EHL+(o) for an object o, we first generate s secure keys k1, ..., ks, then initialize a list
EHL+ of size s. We first compute oi ← HMAC(ki, o) mod N for 1 ≤ i ≤ s. This step maps o to an
element in the group ZN , i.e. the message space for Paillier encryption. Then set EHL+[i] ← Enc(oi)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ s. The operation 	 between EHL+(x) and EHL+(y) are similar defined as in Equation(1),
i.e. EHL+(x)	EHL+(y) def= ∏s−1i=0 (EHL(x)[i] ·EHL(y)[i]−1)ri , where each ri is some randomly generated
value in ZN . Similarly, EHL+ has the same properties as EHL. Let Enc(b) ← EHL+(x) 	 EHL+(y),
b = 0 if x = y and otherwise b is random in ZN with high probability.
We now analyze the false positive rate (FPR) for EHL+. The false positive answer occurs when
x 6= y and Enc(0)← EHL+(x)	 EHL+(y). That is HMAC(ki, x)%N = HMAC(ki, y)%N for each i ∈ [1, s].
Assuming HMAC is a Pseudo-Random Function, the probability of this happens is at most 1Ns . Taking
the union bound gives that the FPR is at most
(
n
2
)
1
Ns ≤ n
2
Ns . Notice that N ≈ 2λ is large number as N
is the product of two large primes p and q in the Paillier encryption and λ is the security parameter.
For instance, if we set N to be a 256 bit number (128-bit primes in Paillier) and set s = 4 or 5, then
the FPR is negligible even for millions of records. In addition, the size of the EHL+ is much smaller
than EHL as it stores only s encryptions. In the following section, we simply say EHL to denote the
encrypted hash list using the EHL+ structure.
Notation. We introduce some notation that we use in our construction. Let x = (x1, . . . , xs) ∈ ZsN
and let the encryption Enc(x) denotes the concatenation of the encryptions Enc(x1)...Enc(xs). Also, we
denote by  the block-wise multiplication between Enc(x) and EHL(y); that is, c← Enc(x) EHL(y),
where ci ← Enc(xi) · EHL(y)[i] for i ∈ [1, s].
6 Database Encryption
We describe the database encryption procedure Enc in this section. Given a relation R with M at-
tributes, the data owner first encrypts the relation using Algorithm 2.
In ER each data item Idi = (o
d
i , x
d
i ) at depth d in the sorted list Li is encrypted as E(I
d
i ) =
〈EHL(odi ),Encpkp(xdi )〉. As all the score has been encrypted under the public key pkp, for the rest of
the paper, we simply use Enc(x) to denote the encryption Encpkp(x) under the public key pkp. Besides
the size of the database and M , the encrypted ER doesn’t reveal anything. In Theorem 6.1, we
demonstrate this by showing that two encrypted databases are indistinguishable if they have the same
size and number of attributes. We denote |R| by the size of a relation R.
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Algorithm 2: Enc(R): Relation encryption
1 Given the relation R, sort each Li based on the attribute’s value for 1 ≤ i ≤M ;
2 Generate a public/secret key pkp, skp for the Paillier encryption scheme and random secret keys
κ1, . . . , κs for EHL;
3 Do sorted access in parallel to each of the M sorted lists Li;
4 foreach data item Ii = 〈odi , xdi 〉 ∈ Li do
5 foreach depth d do
6 Compute EHL(odi ) using the keys κ1, . . . , κs;
7 Compute Encpkp(x
d
i ) using pkp;
8 Store the item E(Idi ) = 〈EHL(odi ),Encpkp(xdi 〉) at depth d;
9 Generate a secret key K for a pseudorandom permutation P and permute all the list based on g.
For 1 ≤ i ≤M , permute Li as LPK(i);
10 The data owner securely uploads the keys pkp, skp to the S2, and only pkp to S1;
11 Finally, each permuted list contains a list of encrypted item of the form
E(Id) = 〈EHL(od),Encpkp(xd)〉. Output all lists of encrypted items as the encrypted relation as
ER;
Theorem 6.1. Given two relations R1 and R2 with |R1| = |R2| and same number of attributes. The
encrypted ER1 and ER2 output by the algorithm Enc are indistinguishable.
The proof is straight forward as it’s easy to see that the theorem holds based on Lemma 5.1 and
Paillier encryption scheme.
7 Query Token
Consider the SQL-like query q = SELECT * FROM ER ORDERED BY FW (·) STOP BY k, where FW (·) is a
weighted linear combination of all attributes. In this paper, to simplify our presentation of the pro-
tocol, we consider binary weights and therefore the scoring function is just a sum of the values of a
subset of attributes. However, notice that for non {0, 1} weights the client should provide these weights
to the server and the server can simply adapt the same techniques by using the scalar multiplication
property of the Paillier encryption before it performs the rest of the protocol which we discuss next.
On input the key K and query q, the Token(K, q) algorithm is quite simple and works as follows: the
client specifies the scoring attribute set M of size m, i.e. |M| = m ≤ M , then requests the key K
from the data owner, where K is the key corresponds the Pseudo Random Permutation P . Then the
client computes the PK(i) for each i ∈ M and sends the following query token to the cloud server S1:
tk = SELECT * FROM ER ORDERED BY {PK(i)}i∈M STOP BY k.
8 Top-k Query Processing
As mentioned, our query processing protocol is based on the NRA algorithm. However, the technical
difficulty is to execute the algorithm on the encrypted data while S1 does not learn any object id or
any score and attribute value of the data. We incorporate several cryptographic protocols to achieve
this. Our query processing uses two state-of-the-art efficient and secure protocols: EncSort introduced
by [7] and EncCompare introduced by [11] as building blocks. We skip the detailed description of these
two protocols since they are not the focus of this paper. Here we only describe their functionalities:
1). EncSort: S1 has a list of encrypted keyed-value pairs (Enc(key1),Enc(a1))...(Enc(keym),Enc(am))
and a public key pk, and S2 has the secret key sk. At the end of the protocol, S1 obtains a list new
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encryptions (Enc(key′1),Enc(a′1))...(Enc(key′m),Enc(a′m)), where the key/value list is sorted based on the
order a′1 ≤ a′2... ≤ a′m and the set {(key1, a1), ..., (keym, am)} is the same as {(key′1, a′1), ..., (key′m, a′m)}.
2). EncCompare(Enc(a),Enc(b)): S1 has a public key pk and two encrypted values Enc(a),Enc(b), while
S2 has the secret key sk. At the end of the protocol, S1 obtains the bit f such that f := (a ≤ b).
Several protocols have been proposed for the functionality above. We choose the one from [11] mainly
because it is efficient and perfectly suits our requirements.
8.1 Query Processing: SecQuery
We first give the overall description of the top-k query processing SecQuery at a high level. Then in
Section 8.2, we describe in details the secure sub-routines that we use in the query processing: SecWorst,
SecBest, SecDedup, and SecUpdate.
As mentioned, SecQuery makes use of the NRA algorithm but is different from the original NRA,
because SecQuery cannot maintain the global worst/best scores in plaintext. Instead, SecQuery has to
run secure protocols depth by depth and homomorphically compute the worst/best scores based on the
items at each depth. It then has to update the complete list of encrypted items seen so far with their
global worst/best scores. At the end, server S1 reports k encrypted objects (or object ids) without
learning any object or its scores.
Notations. In the encrypted database, we denote each encrypted item by E(I) = 〈EHL(o),Enc(x)〉,
where I is the item with object id o and score x. During the query processing, the server S1
needs to maintain the encrypted item with its current best/worst scores, and we denote by E(I) =
(EHL(o),Enc(W ),Enc(B)) the encrypted score item I with object id o with best score B and worst
score W .
Algorithm 3: Top-k Query Processing: SecQuery
1 S1 receives Token from the client;
2 Parses the Token and let Li = LPK(j) for j ∈ M;
3 foreach depth d at each list do
4 foreach E(Idi ) = 〈EHL(odi ),Enc(xdi )〉 ∈ Li do
/* Compute the worst score for object odi at current depth d */
5 Compute Enc(W di ))← SecWorst(E(Idi ), H, pkp, skp), where H = {E(Idj )}j∈m,i 6=j ;
/* Compute the best score for object odi at current depth d */
6 Compute Enc(Bdi )← SecBest(E(Idi ), {j}j 6=i, pkp, skp);
/* gets encrypted list Γd without duplicated objects */
7 Run Γd ← SecDedup({E(Idi )}, pkp, skp) with S2 and get the local encrypted list Γd;
8 Run T d ← SecUpdate(T d−1,Γd, pkp, skp) with S2 and get T d;
9 If |T d| < k elements, go to the next depth. Otherwise, run EncSort(T d) by sorting on
Enc(Wi), get first k items as T
d
k ;
10 Let the kth and the (k + 1)th item be E(I ′k) and E(I
′
k+1), S1 then runs
f ← EncCompare(E(W ′k), E(B′k+1)) with S2, where E(W ′k) is the worst score for E(I ′k), and
E(B′k+1) is the best score for E(I
′
k+1) in T
d;
11 if f = 0 then
12 Halt and return the encrypted first k item in T dk
In particular, upon receiving the token tk = SELECT * FROM ER ORDERED BY {PK(i)}i∈M STOP BY k,
the cloud server S1 begins to process the query. The token tk contains {PK(i)}i∈M which informs S1
to perform the sequential access to the lists {LPK(i)}i∈M. By maintaining an encrypted list T , which
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includes items with their encrypted global best and worst scores, S1 updates the list T depth by depth.
Let T d be the state of the encrypted list T after depth d. At depth d, S1 first homomorphically computes
the local encrypted worst/best scores for each item appearing at this depth by running SecWorst and
SecBest.
In SecWorst, S1 takes the input of the current encrypted item E(I
d
i ) = 〈EHL(odi ),Enc(xdi )〉 and
all of the encrypted items in other lists H at current depth, i.e., H = {E(Idj )}j 6=i,j∈M. S1 runs the
protocol SecWorst with S2, and obtains the encrypted worst score for the object o
d
i . Similarly, in
the protocol SecBest, S1 takes the input of the current encrypted item E(I
d
i ) = 〈EHL(odi ),Enc(xdi )〉
and the list pointers {j}j 6=i that indicates all of the encrypted item seen so far. S1 runs the protocol
SecBest with S2, and obtains the encrypted worst score for the object o
d
i . Then S1 securely replaces the
duplicated encrypted objects with large encrypted worst scores Z by running SecDedup with S2. In the
SecDedup protocol, S1 inputs the current encrypted items, {E(Idi )}, seen so far. After the execution
of the protocol, S1 gets list of encrypted items Γd such that there are no duplicated objects. Next,
S1 updates the encrypted global list from state T
d−1 to state T d by applying SecUpdate. After that,
S1 utilizes EncSort to sort the distinct encrypted objects with their scores in T
d to obtain the first
k encrypted objects which are essentially the top-k objects based on their worst scores so far. The
protocol halts if at some depth, the encrypted best score of the (k+1)-th object, Enc(Bk+1), is less
than the k-th object’s encrypted worst score Enc(Wk). This can be checked by calling the protocol
EncCompare(Enc(Wk),Enc(Bk+1)). Followed by underlying NRA algorithm, it is easy to see that S1 can
correctly reports the encrypted top-k objects. We describe the detailed query processing in Algorithm 3.
8.2 Building Blocks
In this section, we present the detailed description of the protocols SecWorst, SecBest, SecDedup, and
SecUpdate.
8.2.1 Secure Worst Score
At each depth, for each encrypted data item, server S1 should obtain the encryption Enc(W ), which
is the worst score based on the items at the current depth only. Note that this is different than the
normal NRA algorithm as it computes the global worst possible score for each encountered objects until
the current depth. We formally describe the protocol setup below:
Protocol 8.1. Server S1 has the input E(I) = 〈EHL(o),Enc(x)〉, a set of encrypted items H, i.e.
H = {E(Ii)}i=[|H|], where E(Ii) = 〈EHL(oi),Enc(xi)〉, and the public key pkp. Server S2’s inputs are
pkp and skp. SecWorst securely computes the encrypted worst ranking score based on L, i.e., S1 outputs
Enc(W (o)), where W (o) is the worst score based on the list H.
Example 8.1. (Figure 3a) At depth 1, to compute the worst score (lower bound) for X1, SecWorst
takes the encryptions Enc(8), Enc(8) at the same depth from columns R2 and R3 and finally outputs
the Enc(10) as 10 is the lower bound for X1 so far after depth 1.
The technical challenge here is to homomorphically evaluate the encrypted score only based on the
objects’ equality relation. That is, if the object is the same as another o from L, then we add the score
to Enc(W (o)), otherwise, we don’t. However, we want to prevent the servers from knowing the relations
between the objects at any depth. We overcome this problem using the protocol SecWorst(E(I), L)
between the two servers S1 and S2. We present the detailed protocol description of SecWorst in
Algorithm 4.
Intuitively, the idea of SecWorst is that S1 first generates a random permutation pi and permutes
the list of items in L. Then, it computes the Enc(bi) between E(I) and each permuted E(Ipi(i)),
and sends Enc(bi) to S2. The random permutation prevents S2 from knowing the pair-wise relations
between o and the rest of the objects oi’s. Then S2 sends E2
(
ti
)
to S1 (line 13). Based on Lemma 5.2,
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Score List
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
EHL(X1) Enc(10) Enc(26)
EHL(X2) Enc(8) Enc(26)
EHL(X4) Enc(8) Enc(26)
T1
depth 1
R1
EHL(X1) Enc(10)
EHL(X2) Enc(8)
EHL(X3) Enc(5)
EHL(X4) Enc(3)
EHL(X5) Enc(1)
R2
EHL(X2) Enc(8)
EHL(X3) Enc(7)
EHL(X1) Enc(3)
EHL(X4) Enc(2)
EHL(X5) Enc(1)
R3
EHL(X4) Enc(8)
EHL(X3) Enc(6)
EHL(X1) Enc(2)
EHL(X5) Enc(1)
EHL(X2) Enc(0)
(a) SecWorst & SecBest at depth 1. T 1 maintains the encrypted
scores after depth 1.
T2
depth 2
Score List
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
EHL(X2) Enc(16) Enc(22)
EHL(X3) Enc(13) Enc(21)
EHL(X1) Enc(10) Enc(23)
EHL(X4) Enc(8) Enc(23)
EHL(R2) Enc(Z) Enc(22)
EHL(R3) Enc(Z) Enc(23)
R1
EHL(X1) Enc(10)
EHL(X2) Enc(8)
EHL(X3) Enc(5)
EHL(X4) Enc(3)
EHL(X5) Enc(1)
R2
EHL(X2) Enc(8)
EHL(X3) Enc(7)
EHL(X1) Enc(3)
EHL(X4) Enc(2)
EHL(X5) Enc(1)
R3
EHL(X4) Enc(8)
EHL(X3) Enc(6)
EHL(X1) Enc(2)
EHL(X5) Enc(1)
EHL(X2) Enc(0)
(b) SecWorst & SecBest at depth 2. T 2 maintains the sorted
encrypted scores based on their worst scores after depth 2. Note
that, after SecDedup, the duplicated objects X1, X2 do not appear
in the top-k list twice.
Score List
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
EHL(X3) Enc(18) Enc(18)
EHL(X2) Enc(16) Enc(18)
EHL(X1) Enc(15) Enc(15)
EHL(X4) Enc(8) Enc(16)
EHL(R2) Enc(Z) Enc(22)
EHL(R3) Enc(Z) Enc(23)
top-2
T3
depth 3
R1
EHL(X1) Enc(10)
EHL(X2) Enc(8)
EHL(X3) Enc(5)
EHL(X4) Enc(3)
EHL(X5) Enc(1)
R2
EHL(X2) Enc(8)
EHL(X3) Enc(7)
EHL(X1) Enc(3)
EHL(X4) Enc(2)
EHL(X5) Enc(1)
R3
EHL(X4) Enc(8)
EHL(X3) Enc(6)
EHL(X1) Enc(2)
EHL(X5) Enc(1)
EHL(X2) Enc(0)
(c) SecWorst & SecBest at depth 3. T 3 maintains the sorted
encrypted scores based on their worst scores after depth 3 . The
SecQuery halts (based on line 12) in Algorithm 3
Figure 3: An example of securely computing the top-2 query for SecQuery. The table has three
attributes, and the score function f is the sum of all the attributes.
ti = 1 if two objects are the same, otherwise ti = 0. S1 then computes E2
(
Enc(x′i)
) ← E2(ti)Enc(xi) ·(
E2(1)E2(ti)−1)Enc(0). Based on the properties of DJ Encryption,
E2(ti)Enc(xi) · (E2(1)E2(ti)−1)Enc(0) = E2(ti · Enc(xi) + (1− ti) · Enc(0)) = E2(Enc(x′i))
Therefore, it follows that x′i = 0 if ti = 0, otherwise x
′
i = xi. S1 then runs
RecoverEnc(E2(Enc(x′i)), pkp, skp) (describe in Algorithm 5) to get Enc(x′i). Note that the protocol
RecoverEnc is also used in other protocols. Finally, S1 evaluates the following equation: Enc(W (o)) ←∏m
i=1 Enc(x
′
i). S1 can correctly evaluate the worst score, because that, when ti = 0, the object oi is not
the same as o, otherwise, ti = 1. The following formula gives the correct computation of the worst
score:
m∏
i=1
Enc(x′i) = Enc(
m∑
i=1
x′i), where x
′
i =
{
xi if oi = o
0 otherwise
Note that nothing has been leaked to S1 at the end of the protocol. However, there is some leakage
function revealed to S2 at current depth, which we will describe it in detail in later section. However,
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Algorithm 4: SecWorst
(
E(I), H = {E(Ii)}i∈[|H|], pkp, skp
)
: Worst Score Protocol
S1’s input: E(I), H = {E(Ij)}, pkp
S2’s input: pkp, skp
1 Server S1:
2 Let |H| = m. Generate a random permutation pi : [m]→ [m];
3 For the set of encrypted items H = {E(Ij)}, permute each E(Ij) in H as
E(Ipi(j)) = EHL(opi(j)),Enc(xpi(j)).;
4 for each permuted item in E(Ipi(j)) do
5 compute Enc(bj)← EHL(o)	 EHL(opi(j)), send Enc(bj) to S2
6 Receive E2(ti) from S2 and evaluate: E2(Enc(x′i)) := E2(ti)Enc(xi) · (E2(1)E2(ti)−1)Enc(0);
7 Run Enc(x′i)← RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(x′i)
)
, pkp, skp) with S2;
8 Set the worst score Enc(W )← (∏mi=1 Enc(x′i)) ;
9 Output Enc(W ).
10 Server S2:
11 for each Enc(bi) received from S1 do
12 Decrypt to get bi, set ti ← (bi = 0 ? 1 : 0);
13 Send E2(ti) to S1.
Algorithm 5: RecoverEnc(E2(Enc(c)), pkp, skp) Recover Encryption
S1’s input: E2
(
Enc(c)
)
, pkp
S2’s input: pkp, skp
1 Server S1:
2 Generate r
$←− ZN , compute and send E2
(
Enc(c+ r)
)← E2(Enc(c))Enc(r) to S2.
3 Server S2:
4 Decrypt as Enc(c+ r) and send back to S1
5 Server S1:
6 Receive Enc(c+ r) and compute: Enc(c) = Enc(c+ r) · Enc(r)−1;
7 Output Enc(c).
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even by learning this pattern, S2 has still no idea on which particular item is the same as the other
at this depth since S1 randomly permutes the item before sending to S2 and everything has been
encrypted. Moreover, no information has been leaked on the objects’ scores.
8.2.2 Secure Best Score
The secure computation for the best score is different from computing the worst score. Below we
describe the protocol SecBest between S1 and S2:
Protocol 8.2. Server S1 takes the inputs of the public key pkp, E(I) = 〈EHL(o),Enc(x)〉 for the object
o in list Li, and a set of pointers P = {j}i 6=j,j∈M to the list in ER. Server S2’s inputs are pkp, skp.
The protocol SecBest securely computes the encrypted best score at the current depth d, i.e., S1 finally
outputs Enc(B(o)), where B(o) is the best score for the o at current depth.
Example 8.2. (Figure 3b) At depth 2, to compute the best score (upper bound) for X4, SecBest takes
the encryptions seen so far, then based on the scores it outputs Enc(23) as 23 is the upper bound for
X4 after depth 2.
Algorithm 6: SecBest
(
E(Ii),P, pkp, skp
)
Secure Best Score.
S1’s input: E(Ii) in list Li, P = {j}i 6=j , pkp
S2’s input: pkp, skp
1 Server S1:
2 foreach list Li do
3 maintain Enc(xdi ) for Li, where Enc(x
d
i ) is the encrypted score at depth d.
4 Generate a random permutation pi : [l]→ [l];
5 Permute each Li as Lpi(i) = EHL(opi(i)),Enc(xpi(i));
6 foreach permuted E(Ipi(i)) do
7 compute Enc(bi)← EHL(o)	 EHL(oi)
8 send Enc(bi) to S2 receive E2
(
ti
)
and compute:
E2(Enc(x′i)) := E2(ti)Enc(xi) · (E2(1)E2(ti)−1)Enc(0);
9 run Enc(x′i)← RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(x′i)
)
, pkp, skp) with S2;
10 compute E2(Enc(x′di ))←(1−∏di=1 E2(ti))Enc(xdi );
11 run Enc(x′di )←RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(x′di )
)
, pkp, skp) with S2;
12 set Enc(Bi)← Enc(x′di ) · (
∏l
i=1 Enc(x
′
i));
13 compute Enc(B)←∏mi=1 Enc(Bi) and output Enc(B);
14 Server S2:
15 for Enc(bi) received from S1 do
16 Decrypt to get bi. If bi = 0, set ti = 1, otherwise, set ti = 0;
17 Send E2(ti) to S1.
At depth d, let E(I) be the encrypted item in the list Li, then its best score up to this depth is
based on the whether this item has appeared in other lists {Lj}j 6=i,j∈M. The detailed description for
SecBest is described in Algorithm 6.
In SecBest, S1 has to scan the encrypted items in the other lists to securely evaluate the current best
score for the encrypted E(I). The last seen encrypted item in each sorted list contains the encryption
of the best possible values (or bottom scores). If the same object o appears in the previous depth
then homomorphically adds the object’s score to the encrypted best score Enc(B), otherwise adds
15
the bottom scores seen so far to Enc(B). In particular, S1 can homomorphically evaluate (at line 9):
E2(x′i) = E2(ti ·Enc(xi)+(1−ti)·Enc(0)). That is, if ti = 0 which means item I appeared in the previous
depth, x′i will be assigned the corresponding score xi, otherwise, x
′
i = 0. Similarly, S1 homomorphically
evaluates the following: Enc(x′di )) = Enc((1−
∑d
i ti) ·xdi ). If the item I does not appear in the previous
depth, then (1 −∑di ti) = 1 since each ti = 0, therefore, x′di will be assigned to the bottom value xdi .
Finally, S1 homomorphically add up all the encrypted scores and get the encrypted best scores (line 12).
8.2.3 Secure Deduplication
At each depth, some of the objects might be repeatedly computed since the same objects may appear
in different sorted list at the same depth. S1 cannot identify duplicates since the items and their scores
are probabilistically encrypted. We now present a protocol that deduplicates the encrypted objects in
the following.
Protocol 8.3. Let the E(I) be an encrypted scored item such that E(I) = (EHL(o),Enc(W ),Enc(B)),
i.e. the E(I) is associated with EHL(oi), its encrypted worst and best score Enc(Wi), Enc(Bi). Assuming
that S1’s inputs are the public key pkp, a set of encrypted scored items Q = {E(Ii)}i∈[|Q|]}. Server S2
has the public key pkp and the secret key skp. The execution of the protocol SecDedup between S1 and
S2 enables S1 to get a new list of encrypted distinct objects and their scores, that is, at the end of the
protocol, S1 outputs a new list of items E(I
′
1), ...,E(I
′
l), and there does not exist i, j ∈ [l] with i 6= j
such that oi = oj. Moreover, the new encrypted list should not affect the final top-k results.
Example 8.3. (Fig 3b) After scanning depth 2, SecDedup deduplicates the repeated objects in the list
T 2. X1 and X2 are the repeated objects. SecDedup replaces those the objects with random ids R1 and
R2 and replaces the worst scores with large number Z so that they do not appear in the top-2 list.
Intuitively, at a high level, SecDedup let S2 obliviously find the duplicated objects and its scores,
and replaces the object id with a random value and its score with a large enough value Z = N−1 ∈ ZN
(the largest value in the message space) such that, after sorting the worst scores, it will definitely not
appear in the top-k list.
Figure 4: Overview of the SecDedup protocol
Figure 4 gives the overview of our approach. The technical challenge here is to allow S2 to find the
duplicated objects without letting S1 know which objects have been changed. The idea is to let the
server S1 send a encrypted permuted matrix B, which describes the pairwise equality relations between
the objects in the list. S1 then use the same permutation to permute the list of blinded encrypted
items before sending it to S2. This prevents S2 from knowing the original data. For the duplicated
objects, S2 replace the scores with a large enough encrypted worst score. On the other hand, after
deduplication, S2 also has to blind the data items as well to prevent S1 from knowing which items are
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Algorithm 7: SecDedup
(
Q = {E(Ii)}i∈[|Q|], pkp, skp
)
: De-duplication Protocol
S1’s input: E(I1), . . . ,E(Il), pkp
S2’s input: pkp, skp
S1’s ouput: Output E(I
′
1) . . .E(I
′
l) without duplicated objects
1 Server S1:
2 Let |Q| = l;
3 for i = 1 . . . l do
4 for j = i+ 1, . . . , l do
5 Compute Enc(bij)←
(
EHL(oi)	 EHL(oj)
)
;
6 Set the symmetric matrix B such that Bij = Enc(bij);
7 S1 generate it own public/private key (pk
′, sk′);
8 for each E(Ii) do
9 Generate random αi ∈ ZkN , βi, γi ∈ ZN ;
10 Compute E(I˜i) = (EHL(o˜i),Enc(W˜i),Enc(B˜i))← Rand(E(Ii),αi, βi, γi);
11 Compute Hi = Encpk′(αi)||Encpk′(βi)||Encpk′(γi) using pk′;
12 Generate a random permutation pi : [l]→ [l];
13 Permute pi(B), i.e. permute Bpi(i)pi(j) for each Bij ;
14 Permute E(I˜pi(i)) and Hpi(i) for i ∈ [1, l];
15 Send pi(B), {E(I˜pi(i))}li=1, {Hpi(i)}li=1, pk′ to S2;
16 Server S2:
17 Receive pi(B), {E(I˜pi(i))}li=1, {Hpi(i)}li=1, and pk′ from S1;
18 for upper triangle of pi(B) do
19 decrypt bpi(i)pi(j) := Decskp(Bpi(i)pi(j));
20 if bpi(i)pi(j) = 0 then
21 remove E(I˜pi(i)), Hpi(i);
/* Deduplicate items */
22 randomly generate oi, and αi ∈ ZkN , βi, γi ∈ ZN ;
23 set Wi = Z + βi and BI = Z + γi, where Z = N − 1 ;
24 Set E(I ′pi(i)) := (EHL(o) Enc(αi),Enc(Wi),Enc(Bi));
25 Compute H ′pi(i) ← Encpk′(αi)||Encpk′(βi)||Encpk′(γi) using pk′;
26 for remaining Enc(I˜pi(j)), Hpi(j) do
27 generate random α′i ∈ ZkN , β′i, and γ′i ∈ ZN ;
28 Enc(I ′i) = (EHL(o
′
i),Enc(W
′
i ),Enc(B
′
i))← Rand(Enc(I˜pi(j)),α′i, β′i, γ′i);
29 Hpi(j) = Encpk′(αpi(j)),Encpk′(βpi(j)),Encpk′(γpi(j));
30 set H ′i = Encpk′(αpi(j)) · Encpk′(α′i)||Encpk′(βpi(j)) · Encpk′(β′i)||Encpk′(γpi(j)) · Encpk′(γ′i);
31 Generate a random permutation pi′ : [l]→ [l]. Permute new list E(Ipi′(i)) and H ′pi′(i), then send them
back to S1;
32 Server S1:
33 Decrypt each H ′pi′(i) as α
′
pi′(i), β
′
pi′(i), γ
′
pi′(i) using sk
′;
34 foreach E(I ′pi′(i)) = EHL(o
′
pi′(i)),Enc(W
′
pi′(i)),Enc(B
′
pi′(i)) do
35 Run and get Enc(Iˆi) = (EHL(oˆi),Enc(Ŵi),Enc(B̂i))← Rand(Enc(I ′pi′(i)),−α′pi′(i),−β′pi′(i),−γ′pi′(i));
36 Output the encrypted list E(Iˆ1)...E(Iˆl);
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Algorithm 8: Rand
(
E(I),α, β, γ
)
: Blinding the randomness
1 Let E(I) = (EHL(o),Enc(B),Enc(W ));
2 Compute E(α),Enc(β),Enc(γ);
3 Compute EHL(o)← EHL(o) Enc(α), Enc(W )← Enc(W ) · Enc(β), and Enc(B)← Enc(B) · Enc(γ);
4 Output E(I ′) = (EHL(o),Enc(W ),Enc(B));
Algorithm 9: A Secure Update Protocol SecUpdate
(
T d−1,Γd, pkp, skp
)
S1’s input: pkp, T
d−1, Γd (encrypted list without duplicated objects)
S2’s input: pkp, skp
1 Server S1:
2 Permute E(Ii) ∈ Γd as E(Ipi(i)) based on random permutation pi;
3 foreach each permute E(Ipi(i)) do
4 foreach each E(Ij) ∈ T d−1 do
5 Let Enc(Wi), Enc(Bi) be encrypted worst/best score in E(Ipi(i)) , and let Enc(Wj),Enc(Bj) be
encrypted worst/best score in E(Ij);
6 Compute Enc(bij)← EHL(Ipi(i))	 EHL(Ij), send Enc(bij) to S2 and get E2
(
tij
)
;
7 Compute E2(Enc(W ′i ))← E2(tij)Enc(Wi), Enc(W ′i )← RecoverEnc(E2(Enc(W ′i )), pkp, skp),
Enc(W ′j)← Enc(Wj)Enc(W ′i );
8 Compute E2(Enc(B′j))← E2(tij)Enc(Bi) (E2(1)E2(tij)−1)Enc(Bj)
Enc(B′j)← RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(B′j)
)
, pkp, skp);
9 Set Enc(W ′j),Enc(B
′
j) as the updated score for Enc(Ij);
10 compute E2(Enc(W ′i ))← E2(tij)Enc(Wi)(E2(1)E2(tij)−1)Enc(W ′j), run
Enc(W ′i )← RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(W ′i )
)
, pkp, skp) and maintain Enc(W
′
i ) for each E(Ipi(i))
11 Update the encrypted worst score to Enc(W ′i ) for each Enc(Ipi(i)) and keep the original best score
Enc(Bi);
12 Append the updated Enc(Ipi(i)) to T
d−1 and get T d;
13 S1 and S2 execute SecDedup(T
d, pkp, skp) and get the updated list T
d;
14 S1 finally outputs T
d.
15 Server S2:
16 foreach Enc(bi) received from S1 do
17 Decrypt to get bi;
18 If bi = 0, set ti = 1, otherwise, set ti = 0. Send E2
(
ti
)
to S1.
the duplicated ones. S1 finally gets the encrypted items without duplication. Algorithm 7 describes
the detailed protocol.
We briefly discuss the execution of the protocol as follows: S1 first fill the entry Bij by computing
EHL(oi) 	 EHL(oj). Note that, since the encrypted B is symmetric matrix indicating the equality
relations for the list, therefore, S1 only need fill the upper triangular for B. and lower triangular can be
filled by the fact that Bij = Bji. In addition, S1 blinds the encrypted item Enc(Ii) by homomorphically
adding random values and get Enc(I˜i). This prevents S2 from knowing the values of the item since S2
has the secret key. Moreover, S1 encrypts the randomnesses using his own public key pk
′ and get Hi.
To hide the relation pattern between the objects in the list, S1 applies a random permutation pi to the
matrix Bpi(i)pi(j), as well as Enc(Ipi(i)) and Hpi(i). Receiving the ciphertext, S2 only needs to decrypt the
upper triangular of the matrix, S2 only keeps one copy of the Enc(I˜pi(i)), Hpi(i) and Enc(I˜pi(j)), Hpi(j)
if bpi(i)pi(j) = 0. Without loss of generality, we keep Enc(I˜pi(j)), Hpi(j) and replace Enc(I˜pi(i)), Hpi(i) as
line 22-25. For the unchanged item, S2 blinds them using as well (see line 28-30). It worth noting that
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the randomnesses added by S2 are to prevent S1 from discovering which item has been changed or not.
S2 also randomly permute the list as well (line 31). S1 homomorphically recovers the original values
by decrypting the received H ′pi′(i) using his sk
′ (see line 35). S1 eventually the new permuted list of
encrypted items.
For the duplicated objects, the protocol replaces their object id with a random value, and its worst
score with a large number Z. For the new encrypted items that S2 replaced (line 22), Enc(Iˆi) =
(EHL(oˆi),Enc(Ŵi),Enc(B̂i)), we show in the following that Enc(Ŵi) is indeed a new encryption of the
permuted Enc(Wpi′(pi(j))) for some j ∈ [l]. As we can see, the Enc(Ŵi) is permuted by S2’s random pi′,
i.e. Enc(Ŵpi′(i)) (see line 31). Hence, it follows that:
Enc(Ŵpi′(i)) ∼ Enc
(
W ′pi′(i) − β′pi′(i)
)
(2)
∼ Enc(W ′pi′(i) − (βpi′(pi(j)) + β′pi′(i))) (3)
∼ Enc(W˜pi′(pi(j)) + βpi′(pi(j)) − (βpi′(pi(j)) + β′pi′(i))) (4)
∼ Enc(Wpi′(pi(j))) + βpi′(pi(j)) + β′pi′(i) − (βpi′(pi(j)) + β′pi′(i))) (5)
∼ Enc(Wpi′(pi(j))) (6)
In particular, from Algorithm 7, we can see that Equation (2) holds due to line 35, Equation (3) holds
since line 30 and 33, Equation (4) holds due to line 28, and Equation (5) holds because of line 10. On
the other hand, for the duplicated items that S1 has changed from line 22 to 25, by the homomorphic
operations of S1 at line 35, we have
Enc(Ŵpi′(k)) ∼ Enc(W ′pi′(k) − β′pi′(k)) ∼ Enc(Z + β′pi′(k) − β′pi′(k)) ∼ Enc(Z)
Since Z is a very large enough number, this randomly generated objects definitely do not appear in
the top-k list after sorting.
8.2.4 Secure Update
At each depth d, we need to update the current list of objects with the latest global worst/best scores.
At a high level, S1 has to update the encrypted list Γ
d from the state T d−1 (previous depth) to T d,
and appends the new encrypted items at this depth. Let Γd be the list of encrypted items with the
encrypted worst/best scores S1 get at depth d. Specifically, for each encrypted item E(Ii) ∈ T d−1 and
each E(Ij) ∈ Ld at depth d, we update Ii’s worst score by adding the worst from Ij and replace its
best score with Ij ’s best score if Ii = Ij since the worst score for Ij is the in-depth worst score and best
score for Ij is the most updated best score. If Ii 6= Ij , we then simply append E(Ij) with its scores to
the list. Finally, we get the fresh T d after depth d. We describe the SecUpdate protocol in Algorithm 9.
9 Security
Since our construction supports a more complex query type than searching, the security has to capture
the fact that the adversarial servers also get the ‘views’ from the data and meta-data during the query
execution. The CQA security model in our top-k query processing defines a Real world and an Ideal
world. In the real world, the protocol between the adversarial servers and the client executes just like
the real SecTopK scheme. In the ideal world, we assume that there exists two simulator Sim1 and Sim2
who get the leakage profiles from an ideal functionality and try to simulate the execution for the real
world. We say the scheme is CQA secure if, after polynomial many queries, no ppt distinguisher can
distinguish between the two worlds only with non-negligibly probability. We give the formal security
definition in Definition 9.1.
Definition 9.1. Let SecTopK = (Enc,Token, SecQuery) be a top-k query processing scheme and consider
the following probabilistic experiments where E is an environment, C is a client, S1 and S2 are two non-
colluding semi-honest servers, Sim1 and Sim2 are two simulators, and LSetup, LQuery = (L1Query,L2Query)
are (stateful) leakage functions:
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Ideal(1λ): The environment E outputs a relation R of size n and sends it to the client C. C submits
the relation R to Ftopk, i.e. an ideal top-k functionality. Ftopk outputs LSetup(R) and 1λ, and
gives LSetup(R), 1λ to Sim1. Given LSetup(R) and 1λ, Sim1 generates an encrypted ER.
C generates a polynomial number of adaptively chosen queries (q1, . . . , qm). For each qi, C submits
qi to Ftopk, Ftopk then sends L1Query(ER, qi) to Sim1 and sends L2Query(ER, qi) to Sim2.
After the execution of the protocol, C outputs OutputIdealC , Sim1 outputs OutputSim1, and Sim2
outputs OutputSim2.
RealA(1λ): The environment E outputs a relation R of size n and sends it to C. C computes (K,ER)←
Enc(1λ, R) and sends the encrypted ER to S1.
C generates a polynomial number of adaptively chosen queries (q1, . . . , qm). For each qi, C com-
putes tki ← Token(K, qi) and sends tki to S1. S1 run the protocol SecQuery
(
tki,ER
)
with S2.
After the execution of the protocol, S1 sends the encrypted results to C. C outputs OutputRealC , S1
outputs OutputS1, and S2 outputs OutputS2.
We say that SecQuery is adaptively (LSetup,LQuery)-semantically secure (CQA) if the following holds:
1. For all E, for all S1, there exists a ppt simulator Sim1 such that the following two distribution
ensembles are computationally indistinguishable
〈OutputS1 ,OutputRealC 〉 u 〈OutputSim1 ,OutputIdealC 〉
2. For all E, for all S2, there exists a ppt simulator Sim2 such that the following two distribution
ensembles are computationally indistinguishable
〈OutputS2 ,OutputRealC 〉 u 〈OutputSim2 ,OutputIdealC 〉
We formally define the leakage function in SecTopK. Let the setup leakage LSetup = (|R|, |M |), i.e.
the size of the database and the total number of attributes. LSetup is the leakage profile revealed to S1
after the execution of Enc. During the query processing, we allow LQuery = (L1Query,L2Query) revealed to
the servers. Note that L1Query is the leakage function for S1, while L2Query is the leakage function for S2.
In our scheme, L1Query = (QP, Dq), where QP is the query pattern indicating whether a query has been
repeated or not. Formally, for qj ∈ q, the query pattern QP(qj) is a binary vector of length j with a 1
at location i if qj = qi and 0 otherwise. Dq is the halting depth for query q. For any query q, we define
the equality pattern as follows: suppose that there are m number of objects at each depth, then
• Equality pattern EPd(q): a symmetric binary m × m matrix Md, where Md[i, j] = 1 if there
exist opi(i′) = opi(j′) for some random permutation pi such that pi(i
′) = i and pi(j′) = j, otherwise
Md[i, j] = 0.
Then, let L2Query = ({EPd(q)}Dqi=1), i.e. at depth d ≤ Dq the equality pattern indicates the number of
equalities between objects. Note that EPd(q) does not leak the equality relations between objects at
any depth in the original database, i.e. the server never knows which objects are same since the server
doesn’t know the permutation.
Theorem 9.2. Suppose the function used in EHL is a pseudo-random function and the Paillier encryp-
tion is CPA-secure, then the scheme SecTopK = (Enc,Token,SecQuery) we proposed is (LSetup,LQuery)-
CQA secure.
Proof: We describe the ideal functionality Ftopk as follows. An environment E samples samples
φi
$←− {0, 1}logn for 1 ≤ i ≤ n to create a set Φ of n distinct identifiers for n objects. For each object,
E randomly pick M attribute values from ZN . E finally outputs the relation R with the sampled n
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objects associated with M attributes. E sends the R to the client C, and C outsources the relation to
the ideal functionality Ftopk. During the setup phase, Ftopk computes LSetup = (n,M), where n is the
number of the objects and M is the number of the attributes. Then Ftopk sends LSetup to a simulator
Sim1, which we’ll describe it next. Sim1 receives LSetup, then Sim1 generates the random keys κ1, . . . , κs
for the EHL and pkp, skp for the paillier encryption. Then Sim1 encrypts each object using EHL and
each score using the paillier encryption.
The client adaptively generate a number of queries q1 . . . qm. For each qi, Ftopk computes L1Query =
(QP, Dqi) and L2Query = ({EPd(qi)}
Dqi
j=1). Ftopk sends L1Query to Sim1 and sends L2Query = ({EPd(qi)}
Dqi
j=1)
to Sim2. Next, we describe Sim1 and Sim2. As mentioned above, Sim1 learns the leakage function
L1Query = (QP, Dqi). Given the leakage QP, Sim1 first checks if either of the query qi appeared in any
previous query. If qi appeared previously, Sim1 runs the same simulation of SecQuery as before. If not,
Sim1 invokes the simulations for each of the sub-routine from SecQuery. We show in the Appendix ??
(See Definition ?? and Lemma ??) that our building blocks are secure. Therefore, Sim1 can invoke the
simulation the original SecQuery by calling the underlying simulators Sim1 from those sub-protocols
SecWorst, SecBest, SecDedup, and SecUpdate. As those sub-protocols have been proved to be secure,
the Sim1 can simulate the execution of the original SecQuery. Moreover, the messages sent during the
execution are either randomly permuted or protected by the semantic encryption scheme. Therefore,
at the end of the protocol, OutputSim1 looks indistinguishable from the the output OutputS1 , i.e.
〈OutputS1 ,OutputC〉 u 〈OutputSim1 ,Output′C〉
By knowing L2Query, Sim2 can simulate the execution of the original SecQuery. Similarly, Sim2 needs
to call the underlying the simulator Sim2 from the building blocks SecWorst, SecBest, SecDedup, and
SecUpdate. As the messages sent during the execution are either randomly permuted or protected by
the semantic encryption scheme, Sim2 learns nothing except the leakage L2Query. Therefore, at the end
of the protocol, OutputSim2 looks indistinguishable from the the output OutputS2 ,
〈OutputS2 ,OutputC〉 u 〈OutputSim2 ,Output′C〉

10 Query Optimization
In this section, we present some optimizations that improve the performance of our protocol. The
optimizations are two-fold: 1) we optimize the efficiency of the protocol SecDedup at the expense of
some additional privacy leakage, and 2) we propose batch processing of SecDupElim and EncSort to
further improve the SecQuery.
10.1 Efficient SecDupElim
We now introduce the efficient protocol SecDupElim that provides similar functionality as SecDedup.
Recall that, at each depth, S1 runs SecDedup to deduplicate m encrypted objects, then after the
execution of SecDedup S1 still receives m items but without duplication, and add these m objects to
the list T d when running SecUpdate. Therefore, when we execute the costly sorting algorithm EncSort
the size of list to sort has md elements at depth d.
The idea for SecDupElim is that instead of keeping the same number encrypted items m, SecDupElim
eliminates the duplicated objects. In this way, the number of encrypted objects gets reduced, especially
if there are many duplicated objects. The SecDupElim can be obtained by simply changing the SecDedup
as follows: in Algorithm 7 at line 20, when S2 observes that there exist duplicated objects, S2 only
keeps one copy of them. The algorithm works exactly the same as before but without performing the
line 22-25. We also run SecDupElim instead of SecDedup at line 13 in the SecUpdate. That is, after
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secure update, we only keep the distinct objects with updated scores. Thus, the number of items to be
sorted also decrease. Now by adapting SecDupElim, if there are many duplicated objects appear in the
list, we have much fewer encrypted items to sort.
Remark on security. The SecDupElim leaks additional information to the server S1. S1 learns the
uniqueness pattern UPd(qi) at depth d, where UP
d(qi) denotes the number of the unique objects that
appear at current depth d. The distinct encrypted values at depth d are independent from all other
depths, therefore, this protocol still protects the distribution of the original ER. In addition, due to the
‘re-encryptions’ during the execution of the protocol, all the encryptions are fresh ones, i.e., there are
not as the same as the encryptions from ER. Finally, we emphasize that nothing on the objects and
their values have been revealed since they are all encrypted.
Figure 5: SecDupElim
Figure 6: Batching Process
10.2 Batch Processing for SecQuery
In the query processing SecQuery, we observe that we do not need to run the protocols SecDupElim and
EncSort for every depth. Since SecDupElim and EncSort are the most costly protocols in SecQuery, we can
perform batch processing and execute them after a few depths and not at each depth. Our observation
is that there is no need to deduplicate repeated objects at each scanned depth. If we perform the
SecDupElim after certain depths of scanning, then the repeated objects will be eliminated, and those
distinct encrypted objects with updated worst and best scores will be sorted by running EncSort. The
protocol will remain correct. We introduce a parameter p such that p ≥ k. The parameter p specifies
where we need to run the SecDupElim and EncSort in the SecQuery protocol. That is, the server S1
runs the SecQuery with S2 the same as in Algorithm 3, except that every p depths we run line 9-12 in
Algorithm 3 to check if the algorithm could halt. In addition, we can replace the SecDupElim with the
original SecDedup in the batch processing for better privacy but at the cost of some efficiency.
Security. Compared to the optimization from SecDupElim, we show that the batching strategy pro-
vides more privacy than just running the SecDupElim alone. For query q, assuming that we compute
the scores over m attributes. Recall that the UPp(q) at depth p has been revealed to S1 while running
SecDupElim, therefore, after the first depth, in the worst case, S1 learns that the objects at the first
depth is the same object. To prevent this worst case leakage, we perform SecDupElim every p depth.
Then S1 learns there are p distinct objects in the worst case. After depth p, the probability that S1 can
correctly locate those distinct encrypted objects’ positions in the table is at most 1(p!)m . This decreases
fast for bigger p. However, in practice this leakage is very small as many distinct objects appear every
p depth. Similar to all our protocols, the encryptions are fresh due to the ‘re-encryption’ by the server.
Even though S1 has some probability of guessing the distinct objects’ location, the object id and their
scores have not been revealed since they are all encrypted.
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10.3 Efficiency
We analyze the efficiency of query execution. Suppose the client chooses m attributes for the query,
therefore at each depth there are m objects. At depth d, it takes S1 O(m) for executing SecWorst,
O(md) for executing SecBest, O(m2) for SecDedup, and O(m2d) for the SecUpdate. The complexities
for S2 are similar. In addition, the EncSort has time overhead O(m log
2m); however, we can further
reduce to O(log2m) by adapting parallelism (see [7]). On the other hand, the SecDupElim only takes
O(u2), where u is the number of distinct objects at this depth. Notice that most of the computations
are multiplication (homomorphic addition), therefore, the cost of query processing is relatively small.
11 Experiments
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Figure 7: Encryption using EHL vs. EHL+.
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Figure 8: Encryption EHL vs. EHL+ on real data
To evaluate the performance of our protocols, we conducted a set of experiments using real and
synthetic datasets. We used the HMAC-SHA-256 as the pseudo-random function (PRF) for the EHL
and EHL+ encoding, a 128-bit security for the Pailliar and DJ encryption, and all experiments are
implemented using C++. We implement the scheme SecTopK = (Enc,Token,SecQuery), including
all the protocols SecWorst, SecBest, EncSort, and EncCompare and their optimizations. We run our
experiments on a 24 core machine, who serves as the cloud, running Scientific Linux with 128GB
memory and 2.9GHz Intel Xeon.
DataSets We use the following real world dataset downloaded from UCI Machine Learning Reposi-
tory [34]. insurance: a benchmark dataset that contains 5822 customers’ information on an insurance
company and we extracted 13 attributes from the original dataset. diabetes: a patients’ dataset
containing 101767 patients’ records (i.e. data objects), where we extracted 10 attributes. PAMAP: a
physical activity monitoring dataset that contains 376416 objects, and we extracted 15 attributes. We
also generated synthetic datasets synthetic that has 1 million records with 10 attributes that takes
values from Gaussian distribution.
11.1 Evaluation of the Encryption Setup
We implemented both the EHL and the efficient EHL+. For EHL, to minimize the false positives, we set
the parameters as H = 23 and s = 5, where L is the size of the EHL and s is the number of the secure
hash functions. For EHL+, we choose the number of secure hash function HMAC in EHL+ to be s = 5,
and, as discussed in the previous section, we obtained negligible false positive rate in practice. The
encryption Enc is independent of the characteristics of the dataset and depends only on the size. Thus,
we generated datasets such that the number of the objects range from 0.1 to 1 million. We compare
the encryptions using EHL and EHL+. After sorting the scores for each attribute, the encryption for
each item can be fully parallelized. Therefore, when encrypting each dataset, we used 64 threads on
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the machine that we discussed before. Figure 7 shows that, both in terms of time and space, the cost
of database encryption Enc is reasonable and scales linearly to the size of the database. Clearly, EHL+
has less time and space overhead. For example, it only takes 54 seconds to encrypt 1 million records
using EHL+. The size is also reasonable, as the encrypted database only takes 111 MB using EHL+.
Figure 8 also shows the encryption time and size overhead for the real dataset that we used. Finally,
we emphasize that the encryption only incurs a one-time off-line construction overhead.
11.2 Query Processing Performance
11.2.1 Query Performance and Methodology
We evaluate the performance of the secure query processing and their optimizations that we discussed
before. In particular, we use the query algorithm without any optimization but with full privacy,
denoted as Qry F; the query algorithm running SecDupElim instead of SecDedup at every depth, de-
noted as Qry E; and the one using the batching strategies, denoted as Qry Ba. We evaluate the query
processing performance using all the datasets and use EHL+ to encrypt all of the object ids.
Notice that the performance of the NRA algorithm depends on the distribution of the dataset among
other things. Therefore, to present a clear and simple comparison of the different methods, we measure
the average time per depth for the query processing, i.e. TD , where T is the total time that the program
spends on executing a query and D is the total number of depths the program scanned before halting.
In most of our experiments the value of D ranges between a few hundred and a few thousands. For
each query, we randomly choose the number of attributes m that are used for the ranking function
ranging from 2 to 8, and we also vary k between 2 and 20. The ranking function F that we use is the
sum function.
11.2.2 Qry F evaluation
We report the query processing performance without any query optimization. Figure 9 shows Qry F
query performance. The results are very promising considering that the query is executed completely
on encrypted data. For a fixed number of attributes m = 3, the average time is about 1.30 seconds
for the largest dataset synthetic running top-20 queries. When fixing k = 5, the average time per
depth for all the dataset is below 1.20 seconds. As we can see that, for fixed m, the performance scales
linearly as k increases. Similarly, the query time also linearly increases as m gets larger for fixed k.
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Figure 9: Qry F query performance
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Figure 10: Qry E query optimization performance
11.2.3 Qry E evaluation
The experiments show that the SecDupElim improves the efficiency of the query processing. Figure 10
shows the querying overhead for exactly the same setting as before. Since Qry E eliminates all the
duplicated the items for each depth, Qry E has been improved compared to the Qry F above. As k
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increases, the performance for Qry E executes up to 5 times faster than Qry F when k increase to 20.
On the other hand, fixing k = 5, the performance of Qry E can execute up to around 7 times faster
than Qry F as m grows to 20. In general, the experiments show that Qry E effectively speed up the
query time 5 to 7 times over the basic approach.
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Figure 11: Qry Ba query optimization performance
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11.2.4 Qry Ba evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of batching optimization for the Qry Ba queries. Figure 11 shows the
query performance of the Qry Ba for the same settings as the previous experiments. The experiments
show that the batching technique further improves the performance. In particular, for fixed batching
parameter p = 150, i.e. every 150 depths we perform SecDupElim and EncSort in the SecQuery, and we
vary our k from 2 to 20. Compared to the Qry E, the average time per depth for all of the datasets have
been further improved. For example, when k = 2, the average time for the largest dataset synthetic
is reduced to 74.5 milliseconds, while for Qry F it takes more than 500 milliseconds . For diabetes,
the average time is reduced to 53 milliseconds when k = 2 and 123.5 milliseconds when k increases
to 20. As shown in figure 11a, the average time linearly increases as k gets larger. Similarly, when
fixing the k = 5 and p = 150, for synthetic the performance per depth reduce to 61.1 milliseconds
and 92.5 milliseconds when m = 2 and 8 separately. In Figure 11c, We further evaluate the parameter
p. Ranging p from 200 to 550, the experiments show that the proper p can be chosen for better query
performance. For example, the performance for diabetes achieves the best when p = 450. In general,
for different dataset, there are different p’s that can achieve the best query performance. When p gets
larger, the number of calls for EncSort and SecDupElim are reduced, however, the performance for these
two protocols also slow down as there’re more encrypted items.
We finally compare the three queries’ performance. Figure 12 shows the query performance when
fixing k = 5, m = 3, and p = 500. Clearly, as we can see, Qry Ba significantly improves the performance
compared to Qry F. For example, compared to Qry F, the average running time is roughly 15 times
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Dataset bandwidth (MB) latency (sec.)
insurance 8.87 1.41
diabetes 12.45 1.99
PAMAP 15.72 2.5152
synthetic 17.3 2.768
Table 3: Comm. bandwidth & latency (k = 20, m = 4)
faster for PAMAP.
11.2.5 Communication Bandwidth
We evaluate the communication cost of our protocol. Our experiments show that the network latency
is significantly less than the query computation cost. In particular, we evaluate the communication of
the fully secure and un-optimized Qry F queries on the largest dataset synthetic. For each depth, the
bandwidth is the same since the duplicated encrypted objects are filled with encryptions of random
values. Each ciphertext is 32 bytes and each round only a few ciphertexts are transferred. Especially,
if we use m attributes in our query we communicate between m and m2 number of ciphertexts each
time. So, for m = 4, we use between 1024 to 4096 bytes messages. Also, the number of messages per
depth (per step) is 12. So, in the worst case, we need to submit 12 total messages between S1 and S2
of 4KB each.
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Figure 13: Communication bandwidth evaluation
We evaluate the bandwidth on the largest dataset synthetic. Note that, the bandwidth per depth
is independent of k since each depth this communication size only depends on m. As mentioned the
bandwidth is O(m2), by varying m we show in Figure 13a the bandwidth per depth. In Figure 13b, we
show the total bandwidth when executing the top-20 by fixing m = 4. As we can see, the total size of
the bandwidth is very small, therefore, the total latency could be very small for a high-speed connection
between the two clouds. The speed of the network between two clouds depends on the location and the
technology of the clouds. A recent study showed that we can achieve more than 70 Mbps for two clouds
where one is in the US and the other in Japan [19]. Furthermore, with recent networking advances 7,
we expect that the connections between clouds (inter-clouds) will be much higher [8]. However, even
if we assume that the communication between the two clouds is about 50 Mbps, the total cost of the
communication at each depth is below 1 ms! Thus, communication is not a bottleneck for our protocol.
In Figure 13a, we report the actual bandwidth per depth. In Figure 13b, we show the total bandwidth
when executing the top-20 by fixing m = 4. As we can see, the total size of the bandwidth is very small
that confirms our intuition. Also, assuming a standard 50 Mbps LAN setting, we show in Table 3 the
total network latency between servers S1 and S2 when k = 20 and m = 4. Based on the discussion
above, we can see that the communication cost of our protocol is very moderate for any reasonable
7http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/cloud-systems-management/intercloud-fabric/index.html
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assumptions about the connectivity between the two clouds. The total cost of our protocol is dominated
by the computational cost that was presented in the previous section.
11.3 Related works on secure kNN
As discussed previously, although existing work [21] on secure kNN does not directly solve our problem,
we can adopt their techniques to obtain top-k results by restricting our scoring function to be
∑
x2i (o).
We then use as a query a point with large enough values in each attribute and run their secure k-
nearest-neighbor scheme. In order to compare the experiment from [21], during our encryption setup in
our SecTopK, the data owner needs to encrypt the additional squares of the values, i.e. Enc(x2i (o)), then
the scoring function would simply be the sum of all the attributes. We emphasize that the execution
of the rest of our protocol remains the same.
We can now use the results from the experiments in [21]. It is clear that the protocol in [21] is
very inefficient. For example, it is reported that it would take more than 2 hours to return 10 nearest
neighbors for a database of only 2, 000 records. On the other hand, with our scheme, we can return
10 nearest neighbors over a database with the same characteristics of 1 million records in less than 30
minutes. Moreover, as [21] needs to sends all of the encrypted records for each query execution, the
communication bandwidth is very large even for small dataset that has 2,000 records. On the other
hand, in our approach, we show that the bandwidth cost is low and will not affect the performance
much.
12 Top-k Join
We would like to briefly mention that our technique can be also extended to compute top-k join queries
over multiple encrypted relations. Given a set of relations, R1, . . . , RL, each tuple in Ri is associated
with some score that gives it a rank within Ri. The top-k join query joins R1 to RL and produces
the results ranked on a total score. The total score is computed according to some function, F , that
combines individual scores. We consider only (i.e.equi-join) conditions in this paper. Similarly, the
score function F we consider in this paper is also a linear combination over the attributes from the
joining relations. A possible SQL-like join query example is as follows: Q1 = SELECT * FROM A,B,C
WHERE A.1=B.1 and B.2=C.3 ORDER BY A.1+B.2+C.4 STOP AFTER k; where A, B and C are three
relations and A.1, B.1, B.2, C.3, C.4 are attributes on these relations. Our idea is to design a
secure join operator, denoted as ./sec, such that the server S1 obliviously joins the relations based on
the received token. S1 has to invoke a protocol with S2 to get the resulting joined results that meet
the join condition.
12.1 Secure Top-k Join
We provide a description of the secure top-k join in this section. Since a join operator is implemented
in most system as a dyadic (2-way) operator, we describe the secure top-k operator as a binary join
operator between two relations R1 and R2. Consider an authorized client that wants to join two
encrypted relations and get the top-k based on a join condition. Assume that each tuple in Ri has mi
many attributes and each Ri have ni many tuples for i = {1, 2}. Furthermore, denote oij be the jth
objects in Ri and let o
i
j .xk be the kth attribute value.
12.2 Encryption Setup for Multiple databases
Consider a set of relations R1 and R2. The encryption setup is similar as the top-k for one relation.
The difference is that since we have multiple relations on different data we cannot assign a global object
identifier for each the objects in different relations. The difference here is that, in addition to encrypting
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Algorithm 10: Enc(R1, R2): database encryption
1 Generate public/secret key pkp, skp for the pailliar encryption, generate random secret keys
κ1, . . . , κs for the EHL;
2 foreach each oij ∈ Ri do
3 foreach each attribute oij .xk do
4 set E(sk)← 〈EHL(oij .xk),Enc(oij .xk)〉;
5 set E(oij) =
(
E(s1), ..., E(smi)
)
6 Generate a key K for the PRP P ;
7 Permutes the encrypted attributes based on P , i.e. set E(oij) =
(
E(sPK(1)), ..., E(sPK(mi))
)
;
8 Output permuted encrypted databases as ER1 = {E(o11)...E(o1n1)} and ER2 = {E(o21)...E(o2n2)};
an object id with EHL, we encrypt the attribute value using EHL since the join condition generated
from the client is to join the relations based on the attribute values. Therefore, we can compare the
equality between different records based on their attributes. The encryption Enc(R1, R2) is given in
Algorithm 10.
The encrypted relations ER1,ER2 do not reveal anything besides the size. The proof is similar to
the proof in Theorem 6.1.
12.3 Query Token
Consider a client that wants to run query a SQL-like top-k join as follows: Q = SELECT * FROM R1,
R2 WHERE R1.A = R2.B ORDER BY R1.C + R1.D STOP AFTER k; where A, C are attributes in R1 and B, D
are attributes in R2. The client first requests the key K for the P , then computes (t1, t2, t3, t4) ←
(PK(R1.A), PK(R2.B), PK(R1.C), PK(R2.D)). Finally, the client generates the SQL-like query token as
follows: tQ = SELECT * FROM ER1,ER2 WHERE ER1.t1 = ER2.t2 ORDERED BY ER1.t3 + ER2.t4 STOP
AFTER k. Then, the client sends the token tQ to the server S1.
12.4 Query Processing for top-k join
In this section, we introduce the secure top-k join operator ./sec. We first introduce some notation that
we use in the query processing algorithm. For a receiving token tQ that is described in Section 12.4,
let the join condition be JC
def
:=
(
ER1.t1= ER2.t2
)
, and the score function Score = ER1.t3 + ER4.t4.
Moreover, for each E(o1i ) ∈ ER1, let E(xit1) and E(xit3) be the t1-th and t3-th encrypted attribute.
Similarly, let E(xjt2) and E(xjt4) be the t2-th and t4-th encrypted attribute for each E(o
2
j ) in ER2.
In addition, let E(X) be a vector of encryptions, i.e. E(X) = 〈Enc(x1), ...,Enc(xs)〉, and let E(R) =
〈(Enc(r1), ...,Enc(rs))〉, where R ∈ ZsN with each ri $←− ZN . Denote the randomization function Rand
as below:
Rand(E(X),E(R)) = (Enc(x1) · Enc(r1), ...,Enc(xn) · Enc(rn))
= (Enc(x1 + r1), ...,Enc(xn + rn))
. This function is similar to Rand in Algorithm 7 and is used to homomorphically blind the original
value.
In general, the procedure for query processing includes the following steps:
• Perform the join on ER1 and ER2.
– Receiving the token, S1 runs the protocol with S2 to generate all possible joined tuples from
two relations and homomorphically computes the encrypted scores.
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Algorithm 11: SecJoin(tk, pkp, skp): ./sec with JC = (ER1.t1,ER2.t2) and Score = ER1.t3 +ER2.t4
S1’s input: pkp, tk
S2’s input: pkp, skp
1 Server S1:
2 Parse tk, let JC = (ER1.t1,ER2.t2) and Score = ER1.t3 + ER2.t4
3 foreach E(o1i ) ∈ ER1, E(o2j ) ∈ ER2 in random order do
4 Let E(o1i ) =
(
E(xi1), ...E(xim1)
)
and E(o2j ) =
(
E(xj1), ...E(xjm2)
)
;
5 Compute Enc(bij)← EHL(xit1)	 EHL(xjt2), where E(xit1), E(xjt2) are the t1-th, t2-th
attributes in E(o1i ), E(o
2
j );
/* evaluate sij = bij(xit3 + xjt4) */
6 Send Enc(bij) to S2 and receive E2
(
tij
)
from S2;
7 Compute Score as: sij ← E2
(
bij
)Enc(xit3 )Enc(xjt4 );
8 run Enc(sij)← RecoverEnc(Sij , pkp, skp).
9 Combine rest of the attributes for E(oij) as follows: xl ← E2
(
bij
)Enc(xl), where Enc(xl) ∈
{Enc(xi1)...Enc(xjm2)} in E(O1i ), E(O2j );
10 Run Enc(xl)← RecoverEnc(xl, pkp, skp).
11 Server S2:
12 For each received tij , decrypts it. If it is 0, then compute bij ← E2
(
1
)
. Otherwise,
bij ← E2
(
0
)
. Sends bij to S1.
13 Server S1:
14 Finally holds joined encrypted tuples E(oij) = Enc(sij), {Enc(xl)}, where Enc(sij) is the
encrypted Score, {Enc(xl)} are the joined attributes from ER1,ER2.
15 Run L← SecFilter({E(oij), pkp, skp}) and get the encrypted list L.
16 Run EncSort to conduct encrypted sort on encrypted Score Enc(sij), and return top-k
encrypted items.
– After getting all the joined tuples, S1 runs SecFilter({E(oi)}, pkp, skp) (see Algorithm 12),
which is a protocol with S2 to eliminate the tuples that do not meet the join condition. S1
and S2 then runs the protocol SecJoin. S1 finally produce the encrypted join tuples together
with their scores.
• EncSort: after securely joining all the databases, S1 then runs the encrypted sorting protocol to
get the top-k results.
The main ./sec is fully described in Algorithm 11. As mentioned earlier, since all the attributes
are encrypted, we cannot simply use the traditional join strategy. The merge-sort or hash based join
cannot be applied here since all the tuples have been encrypted by a probabilistic encryption. Our
idea for S1 to securely produce the joined result is as follows: S1 first combines all the tuples from
two databases (say, using nested loop) by initiating the protocol SecJoin. After that, S1 holds all the
combined tuples together with the scores. The joined tuple have m1 + m2 many attributes (or user
selected attributes). Those tuples that meet the equi-join condition JC are successfully joined together
with the encrypted scores that satisfy the Score function. However, for those tuples that do not meet
the JC, their encrypted scores are homomorphically computed as Enc(0) and their joined attributes are
all Enc(0) as well. S1 holds all the possible combined tuples. Next, the SecFilter eliminates all of those
tuples that do not satisfy JC. It is easy to see that similar techniques from SecDupElim can be applied
here. At the end of the protocol, both S1 and S2 only learn the final number of the joined tuples that
meet JC.
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Algorithm 12: SecFilter
({E(oi)}, pkp, skp)
S1’s input: {E(oi)}, pkp
S2’s input: pkp, skp
1 Server S1:
2 Let E(oi) =
(
Enc(si),E(Xi)
)
where E(Xi) = 〈Enc(xi1), ...,Enc(xis)〉;
3 Generate a key pair (pks, sks);
4 foreach E(oi) do
5 Generate random ri ∈ Z∗N , and Ri ∈ ZmN ;
6 Enc(s′i)← Enc(si)ri and E(X ′i)← Rand(E(Xi),E(Ri));
7 Set E(o′i) =
(
Enc(s′i),E(X
′
i)
)
;
8 Compute the following: Encpks(r
−1
1 ),Encpks(R1), . . . , Encpks(r
−1
n ),Encpks(Rn);
9 Generate random permutation pi, permute E(o′pi(i)), Encpks(r
−1
pi(i)), and Encpks(Rpi(i));
10 Sends E(o′pi(i)), Encpks(r
−1
pi(i)),Encpks(Rpi(i)), and pks to S2;
11 Server S2:
12 Receiving the list E(o′pi(i)) and Encpks(rpi(i)),Encpks(Rpi(i));
13 foreach E(o′pi(i)) ∈
(
Enc(s′pi(i)),E(X
′
pi(i))
)
do
14 decrypt b← Enc(s′pi(i));
15 if b = 0 then
16 Remove this entry E(T ′pi(i)) and Encpks(r
−1
pi(i)),Encpks(Rpi(i))
17 foreach remaining items do
18 Generate random γi ∈ Z∗N , and Γi ∈ ZmN ;
19 Enc(s˜i)← Enc(s′pi(i))γi and E(X˜i)← Rand
(
E(X ′pi(i)),E(Γi)
)
;
20 Set E(o˜i) =
(
Enc(s˜i),E(X˜i)
)
;
/* evaluate r˜i = r
−1
pi(i)γ
−1
i */
21 compute the following using pks: Encpks(r˜i)← Encpks(r−1pi(i))γ
−1
i ;
/* evaluate R˜i = Rpi(i) + Γ
−1
i */
22 Encpks(R˜i)←Encpks(Rpi(i)) · Encpks(Γi)
23 Sends the E(o˜i) and Encpks(r˜i),Encpks(R˜i) to S1
24 Server S1:
25 foreach E(o˜i) = (Enc(s˜),E(X˜i)) and Encpks(r˜i),Encpks(R˜i) do
26 use sks to decrypt Enc(r˜i) as r˜i, Enc(R˜i) as R˜i;
/* homomorphically de-blind */
27 compute Enc(si)← Enc(s˜i)r˜i and E(Xi)← Rand(E(X˜i),E(−R˜i));
28 Set E(o′i) = (Enc(si),E(Xi));
/* Suppose there’re l tuples left */
29 Output the list E(o′1) ... E(o
′
l).
Below we describe the SecJoin and SecFilter protocols in detail. Receiving the Token, S1 first
parses it as the join condition JC = (ER1.t1, ER2.t2), and the score function Score = ER1.t3 + ER2.t4.
Then for each encrypted objects E(o1i) ∈ ER1 and E(o2i) ∈ ER2 in random order S1 computes tij ←(
EHL(xit1)	 EHL(xjt2)
)rij , where xit1 and xjt2 are the value for the t1th and t2th attribute for E(o1i)
and E(o2j) separately. rij is randomly generated value in Z∗N , then S1 sends tij to S2. Having the
decryption key, S2 decrypts it to bij , which indicates whether the encrypted value xit1 and xjt2 are equal
or not. If bij = 0, then we have xit1 = xjt2 which meets the join condition JC. Otherwise, bij is a random
value. S2 then encrypts the bit bij using a double layered encryption and sends it to S1, where bij = 0
if xit1 6= xjt2 otherwise bij = 1. Receiving the encryption, S1 computes Sij ← E2
(
bij
)Enc(x1t3 )Enc(x2t4 ),
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where x1t3 is the t3-th attribute for E(o1i) and x2t4 is the t4-th attribute for E(o2j). Finally, S1 runs
the StripEnc to get the normal encryption Enc(sij). Based on the construction,
Enc(sij) ∼ Enc
(
bij(x1t3 + x2t4)
)
, where bij =
{
1 if x1t1 = x2t2
0 otherwise
Finally, after fully combining the encrypted tuples, S1 holds the joined encrypted tuple as well as
the encrypted scores, i.e. E(T ) = (Enc(sij), Enc(x11)...Enc(x1m1), Enc(x21), ...,Enc(x2m2)). During
the execution above, nothing has been revealed to S1, S2 only learns the number of tuples meets the
join condition JC but does not which pairs since the S1 sends out the encrypted values in random
order. Also, notice that S1 can only select interested attributes from ER1 and ER2 when combining the
encrypted tuples. Here we describe the protocol in general.
After SecJoin, assume S1 holds n combined the tuples with each tuple has m combined attributes,
then for each of tuple E(Ti) = (Enc(si),E(Xi)), where E(Xi) is the combined encrypted attributes
E(Xi) = 〈Enc(xi1), ...Enc(xim)〉. Next, S1 tries to blind encryptions in order to prevent S2 from know-
ing the actual value. For each E(Ti), S1 generates random ri ∈ Z∗N and Ri ∈ ZNm, and blinds the
encryption by computing following: Enc(s′i) ← Enc(si)ri and E(X ′i) ← Rand(E(Xi),E(Ri)). Then S1
sets E(T ′i ) =
(
Enc(s′i),Enc(X
′
i)
)
. Furthermore, S1 generates a new key pair for the paillier encryption
scheme (pks, sks) and encrypts the following: L = Enc(r
−1
1 )pks ,Enc(R1)pks , . . . ,Enc(r
−1
n )pks ,Enc(Rn)pks ,
where each r−1i is the inverse of ri in the group ZN . S1 needs to encrypt the randomnesses in order
to recover the original values, and we will explain this later. Moreover, S1 generates a random permu-
tation pi, then permutes E(Tpi(i)) and Enc(r
−1
pi(i))pks ,Enc(Rpi(i))pks for i = [1, n]. S1 sends the permuted
encryptions to S2.
S2 receives all the encryptions. For each received E(T
′
pi(i)) = (Enc(s
′
pi(i)),E(X
′
pi(i))), S2 decrypts
Enc(s′pi(i)), if s
′
pi(i) is 0 then S2 removes tuple E(T
′
pi(i)) and corresponding Enc(r
−1
pi(i))pks , Enc(Rpi(i))pks .
For the remaining tuples E(Tpi(i)), S2 generates random r
′
i ∈ Z∗N , and R′i ∈ ZmN , and compute the
following Enc(s˜i) ← Enc(s′pi(i))r
′
i , Enc(X˜i) ← Rand
(
E(X ′pi(i)),E(R
′
i)
)
(see Algorithm 11 line 19). Then
set E(T˜i) =
(
Enc(s˜i),Enc(X˜i)
)
Note that, this step prevents the S1 from knowing which tuples have
been removed. Also, in order to let S1 recover the original values, S2 encrypts and compute the following
using pks, Enc(r˜i)← Enc(r−1pi(i))
r′i
−1
pks
and Enc(R˜i)←Enc(R′pi(i))pks ·Enc(R′i)pks . Finally, S1 sends the E(T˜i)
and Enc(r˜i),Enc(R˜i) to S1. Assuming there’re n
′ joined tuples left. On the other side, S1 receives the
encrypted tuples, for each E(T˜i) = Enc(s˜),Enc(X˜i) and Enc(r˜i),Enc(R˜i), S1 recovers the original values
by computing the following: compute Enc(s′i)← Enc(s˜i)r˜i and E(X ′i)← Rand(E(X˜i),E(−R˜i)). Notice
that, for the remaining encrypted tuples and their encrypted scores, S1 can successfully recover the
original value, we show below that the encrypted scores Enc(sj) is indeed some permuted Enc(spi(i)):
Enc(sj) ∼ Enc(r˜j · s˜j) (see Alg. 11 line 28)
∼ Enc(r−1pi(j)r′−1j · s˜j) (see Alg. 11 line 22)
∼ Enc(r−1pi(j)r′−1j · s′pi(j) · r′j) (see Alg. 11 line 19)
∼ Enc(r−1pi(j)r′−1j · spi(j)rpi(j)r′j) (see Alg. 11 line 6,10)
∼ Enc(spi(j))
If we don’t want to leak the number of tuples that meet , we can use a similar technique from
SecDedup, that is, S2 generates some random tuples and large enough random scores for the tuples to
not satisfy JC. In this way, nothing else has been leaked to the servers. It is worth noting that the
technique sketched above not only can be used for top-k join, but for any equality join can be applied
here.
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12.4.1 Performance Evaluation
We conduct the experiments under the same environment as in Section 11. We use synthetic datasets
to evaluate our sec-join operator ./sec: we uniformly generate R1 with 5K tuples and 10 attributes, and
R2 with 10K tuples and 15 attributes. Since the server runs the oblivious join that we discuss before
over the encrypted databases, the performance of the ./sec does not depend on the parameter k. We
test the effect of the joined attributes in the experiments. We vary the total number of the attribute
m joined together from two tables. Figure 14 shows performance when m ranges from 5 to 20.
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Figure 14: Top-k join: ./sec
Our operator ./sec is generically designed for joining any attributes between two relations. In
practice, one would be only interested in joining two tables using primary-key-to-foreign-key join or
foreign-key-to-primary-key join. Our methods can be easily generalized to those joins. In addition, one
can also pre-sort the attributes to be ranked and save computations in the ./sec processing. We leave
this as the future work of this thesis.
12.5 Related works on Secure Join
Many works have proposed for executing equi-joins over encrypted data. One recent work [39] pro-
posed a privacy-preserving join on encrypted data. Their work mainly designed for the private join
operation, therefore cannot support the top-k join. In addition, in [39], although the actual values for
the joined records are not revealed, the server learns some equality pattern on the attributes if records
are successfully joined. In addition, [39] uses bilinear pairing during their query processing, thus it
might cause high computation overhead for large datasets. CryptDB [40] is a well-known system for
processing queries on encrypted data. MONOMI [45] is based on CryptDB with a special focus on
efficient analytical query processing. [31] adapts the deterministic proxy re-encryption to provide the
data confidentiality. The approaches using deterministic encryption directly leak the duplicates and,
as a result, the equality information are leaked to the adversarial servers. [49] propose a secure query
system SDB that protects the data confidentiality by decomposing the sensitive data into shares and
can perform secure joins on shares of the data. However, it is unclear whether the system can per-
form top-k queries over the shares of the data. Other solutions such as Order-preserving encryption
(OPE) [10, 4] can also be adapted to secure top-k join, however, it is commonly not considered very
secure on protecting the ranks of the score as the adversarial server directly learns the order of the
attributes.
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13 Top-k Query Processing Conclusion
This paper proposes the first complete scheme that executes top-k ranking queries over encrypted
databases in the cloud. First, we describe a secure probabilistic data structure called encrypted hash
list (EHL) that allows a cloud server to homomorphically check equality between two objects without
learning anything about the original objects. Then, by adapting the well-known NRA algorithm, we
propose a number of secure protocols that allow efficient top-k queries execution over encrypted data.
The protocols proposed can securely compute the best/worst ranking scores and de-duplication of the
replicated objects. Moreover, the protocols in this paper are stand-alone which means the protocols
can be used for other applications besides the secure top-k query problem. We also provide a clean
and formal security analysis of our proposed methods where we explicitly state the leakage of various
schemes. The scheme has been formally proved to be secure under the CQA security definition and it
is experimentally evaluated using real-world datasets which show the scheme is efficient and practical.
References
[1] B. Adida and D. Wikstro¨m. How to shuffle in public. In TCC, pages 555–574, 2007.
[2] C. C. Aggarwal and P. S. Yu, editors. Privacy-Preserving Data Mining-Models and Algorithms,
volume 34 of Advances in Database Systems. 2008.
[3] D. Agrawal, A. El Abbadi, F. Emekci, A. Metwally, and S. Wang. Secure data management service
on cloud computing infrastructures. In New Frontiers in Information and Software as Services,
volume 74, pages 57–80. 2011.
[4] R. Agrawal, J. Kiernan, R. Srikant, and Y. Xu. Order preserving encryption for numeric data. In
ACM SIGMOD, pages 563–574, 2004.
[5] A. Arasu, K. Eguro, M. Joglekar, R. Kaushik, D. Kossmann, and R. Ramamurthy. Transaction
processing on confidential data using cipherbase. In ICDE, pages 435–446, 2015.
[6] S. Bajaj and R. Sion. Trusteddb:a trusted hardware based database with privacy and data confi-
dentiality. In SIGMOD, pages 205–216, 2011.
[7] F. Baldimtsi and O. Ohrimenko. Sorting and searching behind the curtain. In FC, 2014.
[8] C. Binnig, A. Crotty, A. Galakatos, T. Kraska, and E. Zamanian. The end of slow networks: It’s
time for a redesign. PVLDB, 9(7):528–539, 2016.
[9] A. Boldyreva, N. Chenette, and A. O’Neill. Order-preserving encryption revisited: Improved
security analysis and alternative solutions. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2011 - 31st
Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 14-18, 2011. Proceedings, pages
578–595, 2011.
[10] A. Boldyreva, N. Chenette, and A. O’Neill. Order-preserving encryption revisited: improved
security analysis and alternative solutions. In CRYPTO ’11, pages 578–595, 2011.
[11] R. Bost, R. A. Popa, S. Tu, and S. Goldwasser. Machine learning classification over encrypted
data. In NDSS, 2015.
[12] S. Bugiel, S. Nu¨rnberger, A. Sadeghi, and T. Schneider. Twin clouds: Secure cloud computing
with low latency. In CMS, pages 32–44, 2011.
33
[13] D. Cash, S. Jarecki, C. S. Jutla, H. Krawczyk, M.-C. Rosu, and M. Steiner. Highly-scalable
searchable symmetric encryption with support for boolean queries. In CRYPTO, 2013.
[14] M. Chase and S. Kamara. Structured encryption and controlled disclosure. In ASIACRYPT, pages
577–594, 2010.
[15] S. Choi, G. Ghinita, H. Lim, and E. Bertino. Secure knn query processing in untrusted cloud
environments. TKDE, 26:2818–2831, 2014.
[16] R. Curtmola, J. Garay, S. Kamara, and R. Ostrovsky. Searchable symmetric encryption: Improved
definitions and efficient constructions. In CCS 2006, pages 79–88. ACM, 2006.
[17] R. Curtmola, J. A. Garay, S. Kamara, and R. Ostrovsky. Searchable symmetric encryption:
Improved definitions and efficient constructions. Journal of Computer Security, pages 895–934,
2011.
[18] I. Damg˚ard and M. Jurik. A generalisation, a simplification and some applications of paillier’s
probabilistic public-key system. In PKC, pages 119–136, 2001.
[19] D. Demmler, T. Schneider, and M. Zohner. ABYA framework for efficient mixed-protocol secure
two-party computation. In NDSS, 2015.
[20] C. Dwork and K. Nissim. Privacy-preserving datamining on vertically partitioned databases. In
CRYPTO, pages 528–544, 2004.
[21] Y. Elmehdwi, B. K. Samanthula, and W. Jiang. Secure k-nearest neighbor query over encrypted
data in outsourced environments. In ICDE, pages 664–675, 2014.
[22] R. Fagin, A. Lotem, and M. Naor. Optimal aggregation algorithms for middleware. In PODS,
2001.
[23] C. Gentry. A fully homomorphic encryption scheme. PhD thesis, Stanford University, 2009.
[24] O. Goldreich and R. Ostrovsky. Software protection and simulation on oblivious RAMs. Journal
of the ACM, 43:431–473, 1996.
[25] H. Hacigu¨mu¨s, B. R. Iyer, C. Li, and S. Mehrotra. Executing SQL over encrypted data in the
database-service-provider model. In SIGMOD, pages 216–227, 2002.
[26] I. Hang, F. Kerschbaum, and E. Damiani. ENKI: access control for encrypted query processing.
In SIGMOD, pages 183–196, 2015.
[27] B. Hore, S. Mehrotra, M. Canim, and M. Kantarcioglu. Secure multidimensional range queries
over outsourced data. VLDB J., 21(3):333–358, 2012.
[28] I. F. Ilyas, G. Beskales, and M. A. Soliman. A survey of top-k query processing techniques in
relational database systems. ACM Comput. Surv., 40(4), 2008.
[29] M. S. Islam, M. Kuzu, and M. Kantarcioglu. Access pattern disclosure on searchable encryption:
Ramification, attack and mitigation. In NDSS, 2012.
[30] C. C. Jaideep Vaidya, Murat Kantarcioglu. Privacy-preserving na¨ıve bayes classification. VLDB
J., 17(4):879–898, 2008.
[31] F. Kerschbaum, M. Ha¨rterich, P. Grofig, M. Kohler, A. Schaad, A. Schro¨pfer, and W. Tighzert.
Optimal re-encryption strategy for joins in encrypted databases. In DBSec, pages 195–210, 2013.
34
[32] M. Kuzu, M. S. Islam, and M. Kantarcioglu. Efficient privacy-aware search over encrypted
databases. CODASPY, pages 249–256, 2014.
[33] R. Li, A. X. Liu, A. L. Wang, and B. Bruhadeshwar. Fast range query processing with strong
privacy protection for cloud computing. PVLDB, 7(14):1953–1964, 2014.
[34] M. Lichman. UCI machine learning repository, 2013.
[35] Y. Lindell and B. Pinkas. Privacy preserving data mining. In CRYPTO, pages 36–54, 2000.
[36] A. Liu, K. Zheng, L. Li, G. Liu, L. Zhao, and X. Zhou. Efficient secure similarity computation on
encrypted trajectory data. In ICDE, pages 66–77, 2015.
[37] C. C. Murat Kantarcioglu. Privacy-preserving distributed mining of association rules on horizon-
tally partitioned data. TKDE, 16:1026–1037, 2004.
[38] P. Paillier. Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes. In EURO-
CRYPT, pages 223–238, 1999.
[39] H. Pang and X. Ding. Privacy-preserving ad-hoc equi-join on outsourced data. ACM Trans.
Database Syst.
[40] R. A. Popa, C. M. S. Redfield, N. Zeldovich, and H. Balakrishnan. Cryptdb: protecting confiden-
tiality with encrypted query processing. In SOSP, pages 85–100, 2011.
[41] L. Ren, C. W. Fletcher, A. Kwon, E. Stefanov, E. Shi, M. van Dijk, and S. Devadas. Constants
count: Practical improvements to oblivious ram. In USENIX Security, 2015.
[42] B. K. Samanthula, W. Jiang, and E. Bertino. Privacy-preserving complex query evaluation over
semantically secure encrypted data. In ESORICS, pages 400–418, 2014.
[43] E. Shi, J. Bethencourt, H. T. Chan, D. X. Song, and A. Perrig. Multi-dimensional range query
over encrypted data. In S&P, pages 350–364, 2007.
[44] D. Song, D. Wagner, and A. Perrig. Practical techniques for searching on encrypted data. In
Oakland S & P, pages 44–55, 2000.
[45] S. Tu, M. F. Kaashoek, S. Madden, and N. Zeldovich. Processing analytical queries over encrypted
data. PVLDB, 6(5):289–300, 2013.
[46] J. Vaidya and C. Clifton. Privacy-preserving top-k queries. In ICDE, pages 545–546, 2005.
[47] J. Vaidya, C. Clifton, M. Kantarcioglu, and A. S. Patterson. Privacy-preserving decision trees over
vertically partitioned data. TKDD, 2(3), 2008.
[48] W. K. Wong, D. W.-l. Cheung, B. Kao, and N. Mamoulis. Secure knn computation on encrypted
databases. In SIGMOD, pages 139–152, 2009.
[49] W. K. Wong, B. Kao, D. W. Cheung, R. Li, and S. Yiu. Secure query processing with data
interoperability in a cloud database environment. In SIGMOD, pages 1395–1406, 2014.
[50] B. Yao, F. Li, and X. Xiao. Secure nearest neighbor revisited. In ICDE, pages 733–744, 2013.
35
